Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1971

NO. 71-886

STRACHAN SHIPPING COMPANY, ET AL, *Petitioners*

v.

CITY OF GALVESTON, *Respondent*

NO. 71-890

C. V. RORIE, JR., *Petitioner*

v.

CITY OF GALVESTON, *Respondent*

APPENDIX

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OPINIONS BELOW

OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
C. V. RORIE, JR. et al v. CITY OF GALVESTON

No. B-2326

From Galveston County, Fourteenth District.

Writs of error granted October 28, 1970. (14 Tex. Sup. Ct. Jour. 47) (Opinion of CCA 456 S.W.2d 421)

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and judgment of the Trial Court affirmed. (Opinion of the Court by Associate Justice Walker. Associate Justices Denton and Daniel not sitting.)

For Petitioners: Eikel and Goller, Robert Eikel and Theodore Goller, Houston, Texas. Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates and Jaworski, Dixie Smith, Houston, Texas. Mandell and Wright, Arthur J. Mandell, Houston, Texas, Royston, Rayzor and Cook, Bryan F. Williams, Jr., Galveston, Texas.

For Respondent: McLeod, Alexander, Powel and Apffel, V. W. McLeod and Ben R. Powel, Galveston, Texas.

This suit was brought by C. V. Rorie, Jr., a longshoreman, to recover for personal injuries sustained while working on board the S.S. Armagh in Galveston. On the controlling question presented by the appeal, we hold that the hoist operator whose negligence caused plaintiff's injuries was, as a matter of law, the borrowed servant of plaintiff's employer.

Plaintiff sought a recovery against Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd., the owners and operators of the ship, hereinafter referred to collectively as the shipowner, and the City of Galveston, operator of the terminal facilities known as Galveston Wharves. Strachan Shipping Company which was the stevedoring company and Rorie's employer, was impleaded by cross-action of the City. The shipowner also filed a cross-action against Strachan, seeking indemnity for any sums it might be required to pay Rorie and a recovery of attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in defense of the suit. Strachan in turn sought judgment over against the City and the shipowner in the event any judgment was rendered against it. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, Strachan's compensation insurance carrier, intervened to recover the compensation and medical benefits paid to Rorie.

The S.S. Armagh was docked in the Port of Galveston for the purpose of discharging a cargo of bulk ore, and Strachan was employed by the shipowner to discharge the cargo. Rorie was one of the longshoremen employed by Strachan to assist in the operation. Strachan arranged to and did use a land-based mobile railway crane, sometimes referred to as a Brown hoist, owned by the City. The ore was scooped out of the ship's hold and transferred into railroad cars on the wharf with a clamshell bucket attached by cables to the hoist. Frank McPeters was the operator of the hoist, and he was assisted by a helper, Herman Ermis, who stayed on the wharf. Both McPeters and Ermis were in the general employ of the City. A flagman employed by Strachan was stationed on the deck of the vessel and gave signals to the crane operator, who was unable to see into the ship's hold.

Rorie was working in the lower hold at the time he was injured. A metal structure about four feet wide and seven feet high, referred to as a stanchion, extended through the center of the hold. On the occasion in question, the bucket struck the stanchion ladder either while it was being lowered into the hold or when it was swung suddenly and violently after being lowered into the hold. The bucket recocheted off the ladder and struck Rorie, thereby causing his injuries.

The jury: (1) refused to find the vessel unseaworthy or the shipowner negligent; (2) found in response to Special Issues Nos. 12 and 13 that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the failure of the hoist operator to exercise ordinary care in its operation; (3) refused to find that the plaintiff was negligent; and (4) in response to Special Issues Nos. 18 and 25 refused to find that Strachan had the right to direct and control McPeters in the operation of the hoist, and found that McPeters was not a loaned employee of Strachan. The trial court concluded that McPeters was the loaned employee of Strachan as a matter of law. It accordingly granted the City's motion to disregard the jury's findings in response to Special Issues Nos. 18 and 25. Judgment was rendered that plaintiff take nothing and that the shipowner recover against Strachan the cost of defending the suit in the amount of $7,500.00.

The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding: (1) that the jury's answers to Special Issues Nos. 18 and 25 are supported by the evidence, and (2) that Special Issues Nos. 12 and 13, upon which Rorie must rely to support any judgment in his favor, constitute an

improper global submission. 456 S.W.2d 421. All parties filed applications for writs of error, and all applications were granted. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm that of the trial court.

It is settled, of course, that a general employee of one person may become the special or borrowed employee of another employer. As we pointed out in Producers Chemical Co. v. McKay, Tex. Sup., 366 S.W.2d 220:

"Whether general employees of one employer have, in a given situation, become special or borrowed employees of another employer is often a difficult question, particularly when employees are furnished with machinery by their general employer to accomplish part of a project or contract undertaken by another. Solution of the question rests in right of control of the manner in which the employees perform the services necessary to the accomplishment of their ultimate obligation. If the general employees of one employer are placed under control of another employer in the manner of performing their services, they become his special or borrowed employees. If the employees remain under control of their general employer in the manner of performing their services, they remain employees of the general employer and he is liable for the consequence of their negligence.

* * *

"When a contract, written or oral, between two employers expressly provides that one or the other shall have right of control, solution of the question is relatively simple. . . ."

The two employers in this case did, in effect, expressly agree that Strachan would have the right to control the

hoist and its operator. The lease of the hoist is governed by Galveston Wharves Tariff Circular No. 4-B, which was published and filed with the Federal Maritime Commission on January 1, 1960. A copy was also sent to various shipping interests, including Strachan. The following provisions of the tariff are relevant here:

"When cranes, derricks, hoists, conveyors, lift trucks, trucks, tractors, etc. are rented or leased to others, it is expressly understood that the unit will be operated under the direction and control of the lessee and the lessee shall be responsible for the operation thereof, and the lessee assumes all risk for injuries or damages which may arise or grow out of the use or operation of said unit.

"It is hereby understood and agreed that in the event lessee uses the operator of said unit employed by the Galveston Wharves, such operator shall be under the direction of the lessee and the operator shall be considered as the agent or servant of the lessee and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such operator during the time of rental or lease. It is incumbent upon the lessee to make a thorough inspection and satisfy himself as to the physical condition and capacity of the unit, as well as the competency of the operator, there being no representation or warranties with reference to such matters."

Although filed with the Federal Maritime Commission, the tariff has not been formally approved by the Commission. Rorie argues, and the Court of Civil Appeals held, that the tariff is an understanding or agreement that is required to be approved by the Commission under Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended. 46 U.S.C.A. § 814. We do not agree. The types of agreements or understandings that must be approved by the Commission

are set out in the statute which, at all times relevant here, provided as follows:

"Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, shall file immediately with the Federal Maritime Board [now Federal Maritime Commission] a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every agreement, with another such carrier or other person subject to this chapter, or modification or cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working agreement. The term 'agreement' in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrangements.

* * *

"All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made after the organization of the Board shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the Board, and before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification, or cancellation."

The statute by its terms thus applies only to agreements: (1) fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; (2) giving or receiving special rates, accommondations or

other special privileges or advantages; (3) controlling, regulating, preventing or destroying competition; (4) pooling or apportioning earnings, losses or traffic; (5) alloting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; (6) limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or (7) in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential or cooperative working arrangement. The tariff in question, which is unilaterally promulgated and uniformly applicable to all who lease equipment from the terminal operator, does not fit any of the categories specified in the statute and in our opinion is not governed by its provisions. This is the view of the Commission, which has filed an amicus curiae brief expressing the opinion that the tariff of a terminal operator furnishing services in connection with common carriers by water becomes effective upon filing.

There is another reason, if one were required, for concluding that the tariff is effective as between Strachan and the City even though it was not approved by the Commission. The statute applies only to an agreement made by a common carrier by water or other person subject to the chapter "with another such carrier or other person subject to this chapter." The term "other person subject to this chapter" is defined as meaning any person not included in the term "common carrier by water" carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water. 46 U.S.C.A. § 801. Although the City's activities clearly bring it within this definition, there is nothing to suggest that Strachan is either a common carrier by water or "other person subject to this chapter" within the meaning of the statute.

Rorie cites a number of cases dealing with agreements falling into one or more of the categories specified in the statute. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Com., 390 U.S. 261, 88 S.Ct. 929, 19 L.Ed.2d 1090; Port of Boston Marine Ter. Ass'n v. Boston Shipping Ass'n, 1st Cir., 420 F.2d 419, reversed, ___U.S.___, 91 S.Ct. 203, 27 L.Ed.2d 203; Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Maritime Com., 9th Cir., 405 F.2d 796; Greater Baton Rouge Port Com. v. United States, 5th Cir., 287 F.2d 86; Anglo Canadian Shipping Co. v. United States, 9th Cir., 264 F.2d 405; River Plate & Brazil Conf. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 2nd Cir., 227 F.2d 60. None of these decisions affords any basis for holding that a tariff published and filed by a terminal operator can have no effect until approved by the Commission. Rorie also suggests that the tariff in this case is comparable to the municipal charter and ordinance considered in National Bank of North America v. S. S. Oceanic Ondine, S.D. Tex., 315 F. Supp. 386. If he is correct in that respect, we simply do not agree with the second and alternative holding stated by the court in support of the judgment rendered in that case.

Rorie further contends that there is evidence to support the conclusion that Strachan did not have the right to control the hoist operator as provided in the tariff. The circumstances upon which he relies will be stated briefly. The hoist was owned and maintained by the City, and the operator was employed and paid by the City. Anyone leasing the hoist was required to use an operator furnished by the City. The hoist remained on the wharf, which was owned by the City, and Strachan was charged for its use on a tonnage rather than an hourly basis.

The City employed a supervisor of the hoist operators. This supervisor made a practice of observing the operations of the different hoists, and he would talk with the operator if he found "something that you don't operate just right." The supervisor was sitting in his automobile and watching the unloading of the S. S. Armagh at the time of the accident. There is also testimony that the stevedoring company does not attempt to direct the operator in his handling of the levers and controls of the hoist.

The hoist was an expensive and complicated piece of equipment and required an experienced operator. In the absence of an express agreement dealing with the right of control, this circumstance tends to support an inference that the owner of the equipment intended for his employees to protect the same and not submit to the control of an inexperienced special employer. See J. A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, Tex. Sup., 431 S.W.2d 327. It has little probative significance, however, when the parties have expressly agreed that the equipment and its operator will be under the control of the special employer. There is no evidence here that the City had ever interfered with a lessee's right to control the equipment and its operator, and it does not appear that the supervisor or any other representative of the City attempted to exercise any control over the manner in which McPeters operated the hoist in unloading the vessel for Strachan. In our opinion the evidence in this case will not support the conclusion that, despite the provisions of the tariff, McPeters remained under the City's control in his operation of the hoist on the occasion in question.

The tariff provisions quoted above are binding upon the City and upon all persons dealing with it. They en-

tered into and became part of the lease agreement between the City and Strachan. See Texas City Ter. Ry. Co. v. American Equit. Assur. Co., S.D. Tex., 130 F. Supp. 843, and authorities there cited. We thus have an agreement expressly vesting the right of control in Strachan, and there is no evidence that the City retained any right of control. In these circumstances the tariff is conclusive, and McPeters was the loaned employee of Strachan as a matter of law. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Francis, Tex. Civ. App., 169 S.W.2d 286 (wr. ref.); Steele v. Wells, Tex. Civ. App.; 134 S.W.2d 377 (wr. ref.); Southern S.S. Co.. v. Meyners, 5th Cir., 110 F.2d 376.

Rorie is correct in saying that Galveston Wharves has, for some purposes, the status of a common carrier by railroad. See Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 285 U.S. 127, 52 S.Ct. 342, 76 L.Ed. 659; United Industrial Workers, etc. v. Board of Trustees, etc., 5th Cir., 351 F.2d 183. It appears to us, however, that this is not material here. We recognize the general rule that a common carrier cannot stipulate for immunity from its own negligence. See United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 72 S.Ct. 666, 96 L.Ed. 907; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439, 38 S.Ct. 354, 62 L.Ed. 820. The tariff provisions now in question deal with the right to control operators of equipment leased from the City. They do not attempt to limit the responsibility of the City for its own fault or negligence, and they could expose the City to liability for injuries sustained by the operator of its equipment. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 905; Art. 8306, Sec. 3a, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat.; Process Engineering Co. of Ft. Worth v. Rosson, Tex. Civ. App., 287 S.W.2d 511 (no writ); Stroud v. Zuzich, Mo., 271

S.W.2d 549; Simmons v. Kansas City Jockey Club, 334 Mo. 99, 66 S.W.2d 119. In our opinion the tariff does not constitute an attempt by the City to limit its liability in contravention of the rule mentioned above.

The Texas Supreme Court, while holding that the gratuitous provision in the Tariff 4-b, as a matter of law establishes loaned servant relationship, also in fact overruled the Court of Civil Appeals opinion holding Special Issue No. 12 to be global in nature. This is evident by its affirmance of the Trial Court's judgment insofar as it awarded $7,500.00 as attorney's fees to the shipowners, stating as follows:

> "Strachan contended in the Court of Civil Appeals and insists here that the trial court erred in awarding the shipowner a recovery against it for the expense of defending the suit. Strachan's liability in this respect arises from a breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike service. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133. Where breach of the warranty is raised but not conclusively shown by the evidence, the shipowner has the burden of establishing a breach by obtaining findings that the stevedore failed to do the work properly or safely. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed2d 798. There is no merit, however, in Strachan's contention that the judgment in favor of the shipowner is not supported by the verdict. *The jury found that Rorie's injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the hoist operator,* and the evidence shows as a matter of law that the operator was the borrowed employee of Strachan at the time. Breach of the implied warranty is thus established. Strachan does not com-

plain of the charge and has consistently taken the position that Special Issues Nos. 12 and 13 were entirely proper."

RUEL C. WALKER,
Associate Justice.

Associate Justices Denton and Daniel not sitting.

Opinion delivered July 28, 1971.

No. 205.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Houston (14th Dist.).

C. V. RORIE, Jr., et al., Appellants,

v.

CITY OF GALVESTON, Appellee.

June 10, 1970.

Rehearing Denied July 8, 1970.

SAM D. JOHNSON, Justice.

C. V. Rorie, Jr., a longshoreman, brought this suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while working on board the ship SS Armagh in Galveston, Texas, on September 6, 1960. He named as defendants the City of Galveston, hereinafter sometimes called City and Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd. the owners and operators of the ship SS Armagh, hereinafter collectively called shipowner.

Strachan Shipping Company was the stevedoring company and Rorie's employer. Strachan was impleaded by the cross-action of the City. Subsequently, the shipowner also filed a cross-action against Strachan seeking indemnity for any sums it might be required to pay to Rorie as a consequence of his suit. Strachan counterclaimed against both

defendants. Strachan's workmen's compensation insurance carrier, Texas Employers' Insurance Association, intervened to recover the compensation and medical payments made to Rorie as a consequence of his injuries on the ship.

Rorie's suit was dismissed for want of prosecution by the District Court on July 12, 1966. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals for the First Supreme Judicial District of Texas, and the case remanded to the District Court for trial on the merits. See: Rorie v. Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., 414 S.W.2d 948, ref., n.r.e.

After remand the case proceeded to trial before a jury in 1968. The jury's verdict found the City's employee at fault for Rorie's damages and granted Rorie recovery of damages in the sum of $75,000 from the City. It exonerated the shipowner from any liability to Rorie for unseaworthiness or negligence. It further exonerated Strachan from any liability on the cross-actions of the City and the shipowner.

The trial court granted the motion of the City for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered a final judgment that Rorie take nothing from the defendants below, the City and the shipowners, and that the shipowner recover from Strachan the sum of $7,500.00 for attorney's fees and disbursements incurred in the successful defense of Rorie's suit. All other relief was denied.

With the exception of the City, all parties have appealed.

It is to be noted that judgment in the instant case was signed and entered on August 26, 1968, and that two days thereafter a letter was sent to the official court

reporter of the trial court requesting preparation of the statements of facts. By affidavit of the court reporter it appears that such work was not even begun until September 15, 1969, over twelve months after trial. The statement of facts was filed in the Court on January 6, 1970, over a year and four months following the initial request therefor. During this period this Court has been presented with no less than eight sworn motions by the court reporter requesting extensions of time. Such delay on the part of the court reporter (solely responsible to the judge of the trial court) is a major reason that this case comes before this Court for determination almost ten years after the date of the accident.

The SS Armagh, a deep-sea cargo vessel on board which the the appellant, C. V. Rorie, Jr., was injured, was docked in the Port of Galveston for the purpose of discharging a cargo of bulk ore. Strachan, a stevedoring company with offices in Galveston, was engaged by the shipowner to provide the necessary longshoremen and equipment to discharge the Armagh's cargo.

To discharge the bulk ore, Strachan arranged for the use of a land-based mobile railway crane sometimes hereafter referred to as the Brown Hoist crane, which was owned by the City. The Brown Hoist crane operated on railroad tracks on the wharf adjacent to the pier where the SS Armagh was moored. The evidence is undisputed that the City furnished the Brown Hoist crane, its operator, Frank McPeters, and a helper, Herman Ermis. McPeters, the operator of the Brown Hoist crane at the time of the accident, was shown to be deceased at the time of trial. A supervisor employed by the City, Johnnie Johnston, was also present on the wharf.

The five longshoremen in Rorie's gang were discharging a cargo of ore from the ship. Rorie was assigned to work in the hold. W. L. Patterson was the signalman. Herman Weber, the gang foreman who died prior to commencement of this trial, operated the ship's winch. The remaining two longshoremen were assigned to work on the rail cars on the dock.

At the time of the accident ore was being discharged from the lower hold of the No. 5 hatch. Running lengthway with the ship down the center of this particular hold was a stanchion or metal structure about four feet wide and seven feet high. This structure extended from the engine room to the stern of the ship to cover the vessel's propeller shaft.

In normal procedure the ore was scooped out of the ship's hold by a clamshell bucket attached by cables to the Brown Hoist crane and emptied into rail cars positioned on the track on the pier adjacent to the ship. After emptying, the operator of the Brown Hoist crane would swing the empty clamshell bucket back over the ship's open hatchway and upon receipt of a signal from the flagman, Patterson, would lower it onto the hold alongside the stanchion which protects the propellor shaft. On the flagman's signal the operator of the Brown Hoist crane would stop the clamshell bucket about one to two feet above the deck. The Brown Hoist crane operator would then, again on the flagman's signal, move the clamshell bucket to the nearest permissible proximity of the ore to be scooped up.

To drag the clamshell bucket under the overhead deck to the ore piled against the side of the ship a cable had

been rigged from the ship's winch through two blocks. These blocks were positioned so that the clamshell bucket, after it had been stopped above the deck in the hatchway, could be pulled into position by use of the cable attached to the ship's winch. Rorie, who was working on the top of the ore in the lower hold, would take a hook attached to the end of the cable which ran from the ship's winch and carry it to the edge of the hatchway and attach it to the clamshell bucket. Then, upon a signal from the signalman, Patterson, the operator of the ship's winch would pull the clamshell bucket back into the wing of the hold and on top of the cargo. The bucket would then, again on signal from the signalman, be opened by the operator of the Brown Hoist crane and dropped on the ore. The hook attached to the cable from the ship's winch would next be detached from the clamshell bucket by Rorie. The operator of the shore-based Brown Hoist crane would then on signal from Patterson pull the clamshell bucket toward the center of the vessel, into the hatchway, and this movement of the open bucket would fill it as it moved through the ore. Finally, after the clamshell bucket had cleared and reached the open hatchway, the Brown Hoist crane operator would, on signal from the signalman, hoist the bucket out of the hold and empty the ore into the railway car on the dock.

The record indicates that immediately prior to Rorie's injury the Brown Hoist crane operator swung the clamshell bucket over the main deck hatchway of the No. 5 hold, and in response to Patterson's signal, the clamshell bucket was being lowered into the hold. There are two versions of what next transpired. Patterson, the signalman, testified that the clamshell bucket was lowered completely

into the lower hold and was stopped in its usual position two or three feet above the deck. Then without any signal on his part, the bucket suddenly and rapidly swung backward toward the stern of the ship and then forward where it hit the stanchion ladder and the stanchion in the middle of the hold, then ricocheted and hit the cargo ore, then ricocheted again hitting and pinning Rorie under it. This version of the accident is at variance with that testified to by Rorie, the plaintiff. It was Rorie's testimony that he was back in the wing of the hold looking in the direction the clamshell bucket was to descend. He testified the first thing he saw was "the bucket hit the ladder and upright center-line stanchion just below the 'tween-deck, and fire just flew." The plaintiff's testimony was quite clear that the clamshell bucket had not fully descended into the lower hold where he was stationed and that if it had he would have seen it. Rorie proceeded to testify that it was while the clamshell bucket was being lowered down into the hold that it struck the stanchion ladder and ricocheted on to him causing his injuries. According to Rorie's testimony this occurred suddenly and unexpectedly. Under either version it appears that at the time Rorie was injured neither the cable from the ship's winch nor any other ship's equipment was attached to the clamshell bucket or in any manner involved in the accident. It further appears that at the time the clamshell bucket hit Rorie he was climbing on a sweat batten (a timber which protects the metal skin of the ship) trying to get out of the way. It does not appear to be disputed but that the operation of the Brown Hoist crane caused serious and permanent injuries to Rorie.

The jury found that McPeters, the Brown Hoist crane operator, struck the clamshell bucket against the ladder in the No. 5 lower hold (special issue no. 11), that such act was negligence (special issue no. 12), and a proximate cause of Rorie's injuries (special issue no. 13). The jury also found that the stevedoring company, Strachan, did not have the right to direct and control McPeters in the operation of the Brown Hoist crane (special issue no. 18) and that McPeters, the operator of the Brown Hoist crane, was not a loaned employee of Strachan (special issue no. 25). In rendering judgment non obstante veredicto for the City, the trial court disregarded the jury's answers to special issues nos. 18 and 25.

[1, 2] A trial court may not disregard the jury's findings of fact and enter judgment non obstante veredicto unless there is no evidence of probative value upon which the jury could have relied in making its determination of fact. In considering such a motion all testimony must be considered in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is sought and every reasonable intendment deducible from the evidence is to be indulged in such party's favor. Leyva v. Pacheco, 163 Tex. 638, 358 S.W. 2d 547, 550 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Lynch v. Ricketts, 158 Tex. 487, 314 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Burt v. Lochausen, 151 Tex. 289, 249 S.W.2d 194, 199 (Sup. Ct. 1952).

[3] There is no dispute that McPeters, the operator of the Brown Hoist crane, was a general employee of the City of Galveston. In addition, McPeters had been in the City's employ for many years and was trained by the City for this particular work. The City paid McPeters' salary and deducted from it retirement contributions, and in-

come taxes. The City provided McPeters pension and welfare benefits. The City had employed McPeters initially and had the sole right to discharge him. A witness called by the City and familiar with the practice testified that he had never seen a longshoreman operate a City crane and that he would not let a longshoreman operate one. Neither McPeters nor any other crane operator would subject himself to the control of a stevedoring company in the operation of the City's cranes. The City's crane was an expensive and complicated piece of machinery which could not be repaired by anyone other than the City. The crane's value was estimated at between $75,000 and $100,000. We believe the record to be clear that any use of the City's crane could only be with the operator furnished by the City and that the user had no right to control the City's operator in the operation of the crane.

Despite the record of these facts and findings of the jury (special issues 18 and 25), the trial court granted the City's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. Apparently, and the City so contends, the trial court granted the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto on the basis of a "tariff" promulgated by the City, and which provided in No. 4-B, item 97, as follows:

> "It is hereby understood and agreed that in the event lessee uses the operator of said unit employed by the Galveston Wharves, such operator shall be under the direction of the lessee and the operator shall be considered as the agent or servant of the lessee and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such operator during the time of rental or lease."

It is the City's position that the foregoing provision in the tariff is determinative of the loaned servant question.

[4] We hold that the jury's answers were fully supported by the evidence and that the judgment non obstante veredicto was erroneously entered. See Insurors Indemnity & Insurance Co. v. Pridgen, 223 S.W.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Goodwin v. Wilhelm Steel Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 311 S.W.2d 510, ert. ref.; Polanco v. Austin Bridge Co., Tex. Civ. App., 348 S.W.2d 728, no writ hist. A general employee of one person will not become the loaned servant of another where the evidence shows the right of control was in fact retained by the general employer. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Paulk, 180 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1950).

[5] We further conclude that the tariff in question does not avail the City. Title 46, U.S.C.A., Sec. 814 et seq., (the shipping act) provides, "All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made after the organization of the Board shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the Board. * * *" There is no evidence in the instant record that the tariff was approved by the Federal Maritime Commission upon which it necessarily depended for viability. Port of Tacoma v. S. S. Duval, 9 Cir., 364 F.2d 615; Greater Baton Rogue Port Commission v. United States, 287 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261, 88 S.Ct. 929, 19 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1968). The record gives no indication that the tariff was agreed to by the parties or that it was ever received by Strachan. Absent, therefore, the required approval by the Maritime Commission the tariff appears to be no more than a unilateral declaration of the City. Appellant's points of error relating to the trial court's granting the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto are sustained.

The City of Galveston submits cross-points of error contending that the cause should be remanded rather than rendered if the trial court's judgment is not affirmed. The first two cross-points contend that special issues nos. 12 and 13 were global and that the court should have submitted special issues of negligence. The pertinent special issues and the answers thereto are as follows:

"SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 11

"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, in the operation of the Brown hoist No. 8, the operator of said hoist struck the clam-bucket attached to such hoist against the ladder in the lower hold of No. 5 hatch?

"Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'

"Answer: We do

"If you have answered Special Issue No. 11 'We do,' and only in that event, then answer:

"SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 12

"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the operator of the Brown hoist No. 8, in striking the clam-bucket attached to such hoist against the ladder in the lower hold of No. 5 hatch, failed to exercise ordinary care in the operation of said hoist?

"Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'

"By the term 'ordinary care,' as used in this charge, is meant that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances."

"Answer: We do.

"If you have answered Special Issue No. 12 'We do,' and only in that event, then answer:

"SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 13

"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries?

"Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'

"Answer: We do"

Timely and proper objection was made by the City (to special issue no. 12 and 13) on the grounds that they amounted to a global submission and because they constituted a general charge rather than an inquiry on specific acts of negligence. The City contends that specific issues of negligence must be submitted to and passed upon favorably by the jury in order to sustain a judgment, citing Kainer v. Walker, 377 S.W.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Roosth & Genecov Production Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Driver v. Worth Construction Co., 154 Tex. 66, 273 S.W.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 387 S.W.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Jack Cane Corporation v. Gonzales, Tex. Civ. App., 410 S.W.2d 953, no writ hist.; Simmons Motor Co. v. Mosley, Tex. Civ. App., 379 S.W.2d 711, ref., n.r.e.; Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Carpenter, Tex. Civ. App., 402 S.W.2d 198; Thomas v. Shut, Tex. Civ. App., 448 S.W.2d 536; and LeBlanc, Inc. v. Gulf Bitulithic Co., Tex. Civ. App., 412 S.W.2d 86, ref., n.r.e.

[6] In response, the plaintiff makes what will be considered alternative contentions. First, plaintiff contends it was undisputed that the operator of the Brown Hoist crane

had the exclusive control of the operation of the hoist so that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable. We cannot agree. As we view the instant record "exclusive control" on the part of the operator (McPeters) was indeed disputed throughout the entire record. We believe it to be apparent that at the time and on the occasion in question McPeters' operation of the Brown Hoist crane was dependent upon signals being given by the signalman, Patterson, who was an employee of Strachan. McPeters was at the controls of the Brown Hoist crane but was positioned so that he could not see down into the hold of the ship, could not see the stanchion ladder or the stanchion, and could not see Rorie. By virtue of the operator's inability to see into the hold the use of a signalman was essential to the Brown Hoist crane's operation of the clamshell bucket. The clamshell bucket was made of iron, was estimated to weigh in the neighborhood of four thousand pounds, was moved a considerable distance both vertically and horizontally, and was used in a reasonably close proximity to the various individuals heretofore indicated. We believed it to be inescapable that no operation or movement of the clamshell bucket would be made where the operator of the Brown Hoist crane could not observe its position or had the assistance of a signalman so as to be enabled to determine its position. A part of the signalman's responsibility was to see that the man in the hold was safely positioned in relation to the movement of the bucket. It is apparent that assistance in the form of signals and directions from the signalman, Patterson, were indispensible to the operation of the Brown Hoist crane when it was in the hold or was descending into the hold. This being true we must conclude that no exclusive control by McPeters, the Brown Hoist crane operator, is

indicated in this record. This is true under either version of how the accident occurred.

[7] Such record is dissimilar from that in Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1965), relied upon by the plaintiff. Aside from the patent factual dissimilarity the instant case contains no jury finding of exclusive control. In Bond, supra, the jury found exclusive control in one of the defendants, Adolphus Tower Building. (Court of Civil Appeals opinion, Otis Elevator Co. v. Bond, 373 S.W.2d 518). The Supreme Court stated, "* * * the evidence *shows conclusively* that Otis was in control of the elevator jointly with (a co-defendant) Adolphus Tower. * * *" (Emphasis added). Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., supra, at p. 686. For the doctrine to be invoked it must be shown that the instrumentality by which the harm was occasioned was in the exclusive control of the defendant. As our Supreme Court has recently stated, "As a matter of law, this is not a *res ipsa loquitur* case. The record shows conclusively that the instrumentality causing the harm was not under the *exclusive control* of Brown or his employer Hughes." (2nd emphasis added). Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See also City of San Antonio v. Esquivel, 163 Tex. 222, 353 S.W.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1944).

[8] In what is considered an alternative contention the plaintiff asserts that the issues are sufficiently specific and do not constitute a global submission. Special issue No. 11 inquired whether or not the operator of the Brown Hoist crane struck the clamshell bucket against the ladder in the hold. An affirmative answer to this issue *does* appear to have been conclusively established in the record.

Special issues 12 and 13, however, inquire, whether or not the operator failed to exercise ordinary care, and contingently, if such failure was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. It is first to be noted that five specific acts of negligence on the part of the City were pled by the plaintiff; such specific pleading preceding the plaintiff's pleading on the basis of res ipsa loquitur. It is again also noted that timely and proper objections to these last two special issues were urged by the City. The possible alternative which might arise in the absence of proper and timely objection suggested by Justice Walker in Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., supra, do not exist here. The instant case is one on which reliance is placed on an "ordinary care" issue devoid of any such assistance and standing on the fact situation described. "It is nevertheless well settled that as a general rule and when the question is properly raised, special issues relating to either primary or contributory negligence should be restricted to specific acts and omissions which have been raised by the pleadings and evidence." Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., supra, 387 S.W.2d at p. 647. We must conclude that the "proper control" issue condemned in Barclay, supra, and the "ordinary care" issue condemned in Kainer, supra, are no more specific than the issues here used. The City's cross-points of error must be sustained.

By virtue of this determination it is incumbent upon this Court to reverse and remand the instant case to the trial court. This being true we do not reach Strachan's points of error grounded in the trial court's award of recovery to the ship owners of attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred in the defense of plaintiff's suit against the shipowners. Neither do we reach the contention of plaintiff's counsel that a reasonable attorney's fee should be

awarded him out of the reimbursement awarded by the trial court to Texas Employers Insurance Association, intervenors herein, for the medical expenses and compensation insurance benefits paid to plaintiff.

[9] In view of the disposition here made of the instant case, it is to be noted that the City in cross-points of error numbers 3, 4 and 5, contends that the trial court should have submitted the City's requested issues as to the alleged negligence of the plaintiff Rorie in failing to position himself safely with respect to the clamshell bucket. The facts evident in the instant record show, however, that the plaintiff had to be within a relatively close proximity of the bucket in order to fulfill his tasks as a workman. Under such circumstances the possibility that Rorie could have stationed himself somewhere in the ship's hold that was further removed from the clamshell bucket does not raise an issue as to negligence on his part in failing to do so. These cross-points of error are overruled.

For the reasons heretofore stated, this case is reversed and remanded.

BARRON, Justice (dissenting).

While I agree with the opinion of the majority generally, I cannot agree that this cause should be reversed and remanded because special issues numbers 12 and 13 are alleged to be global.

I would hold that the above special issues are sufficiently specific under the peculiar facts of this case. I do not consider cases such as Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 387 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. Sup.), and similar authority to be here applicable or controlling.

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY
56th Judicial District of Texas

C. V. RORIE, JR.

v.

AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL.

NO. 96,190

(Filed August 26, 1968)

JUDGMENT

On the 23rd day of April, 1968, came on to be heard the above entitled and numbered cause, wherein C. V. Rorie, Jr. is plaintiff, Texas Employers' Insurance Association is Intervenor, Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd. and Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., and the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves and the City of Galveston are defendants, and Strachan Shipping Company is cross-defendant, and came the parties by and through their attorneys of record and announced ready for trial, and a jury of twelve (12) jurors were duly drawn, impaneled and sworn in to try said cause, and then said cause proceeded to trial. Whereupon plaintiff introduced his testimony and

rested, and the defendant, Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, having duly filed and presented its Motion for Instructed Verdict, the said Motion was granted and sustained by the Court. Thereafter, defendants, Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd. and Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., rested without presenting any evidence and thereafter the City of Galveston introduced its testimony and rested; and thereafter cross-defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, introduced its evidence and rested, and the jury having heard the pleadings, the evidence, the Charge of Court and argument of counsel, on the 3rd day of May, 1968, retired to consider their verdict, and on the 7th day of May, 1968, returned their verdict in open court in the form of Special Issues and answers thereto, to-wit:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd., at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, acting by and through their master, mates, agents, servants and employees, failed to provide the Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work?

To which the jury answered "We do not."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 1 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a cause, in whole or in part, of Plaintiff's injuries?

To which the jury gave no answer.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 3

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd., at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, acting by and through their master, mates, agents, servants and employees, failed to exercise that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances to provide the Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work?

To which the jury answered "We do not."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 3 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 4

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a cause, in whole or in part, of Plaintiff's injuries?

To which the jury gave no answer.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 5

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, the failure of Defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd., to discharge the ore from the forward end of the lower hold of Hatch No. 5 with the use of a bulldozer to move the cargo into the inshore portion of Hatch No. 5 exposed Plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm?

To which the jury answered "We do not."

If your have answered Special Issue No. 5 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 6

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a cause, in whole or in part, of Plaintiff's injuries?

To which the jury gave no answer.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 7

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, the failure of Defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd., to discharge the ore from the forward end of the lower hold of Hatch No. 5 with the use of ore buckets to move the cargo into the inshore portion of the square of the hatch exposed Plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm?

To which the jury answered "We do not."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 7 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 8

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a cause, in whole or in part, of Plaintiff's injuries?

To which the jury gave no answer.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 9

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, the failure of Defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd., to discharge the ore from the forward end of the lower hold of Hatch No. 5 with the use of skids to move the cargo into the inshore portion of Hatch

No. 5 exposed Plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm?

To which the jury answered "We do not."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 9 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 10

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a cause, in whole or in part, of Plaintiff's injuries?

To which the jury gave no answer.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 11

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, in the operation of the Brown hoist No. 8, the operator of said hoist struck the clam-bucket attached to such hoist against the ladder in the lower hold of No. 5 hatch?

To which the jury answered "We do."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 11 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 12

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the operator of the Brown hoist No. 8, in striking the clam-bucket attached to such hoist against the ladder in the lower hold of No. 5 hatch, failed to exercise ordinary care in the operation of said hoist?

To which the jury answered "We do."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 12 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 13

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the operator of the Brown hoist No. 8, in strik-

ing the clam-bucket attached to such hoist against the ladder in the lower hold of No. 5 hatch, failed to exercise ordinary care in the operation of said hoist?

To which the jury answered "We do."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 12 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 13

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries?

To which the jury answered "We do."

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 14

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time and on the occasion in question, C. V. Rorie failed to keep such a lookout as would have been kept by a person of ordinary prudence, in the exercise of ordinary care, under the same or similar circumstances?

To which the jury answered "We do not."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 14 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 15

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a proximate cause of the accident in question?

To which the jury gave no answer.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 15 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 16

By what percentage do you find that such failure,

if any, proximately contributed to the Plaintiff's injuries, if any?

To which the jury gave no answer.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 17

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time and on the occasion in question, the acts or omissions of Strachan Shipping Company employees were not the sole proximate cause of the accident in question?

To which the jury answered "They were not the sole proximate cause."

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 18

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, on the occasion in question, Strachan Shipping Company had the right to direct and control Frank McPeters in the operation of the Brown hoist No. 8 on the occasion in question?

To which the jury answered "We do not."

If you have answered Special Issue No. 1 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 19

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, resulted from a failure on the part of Strachan Shipping Company, its agents, servants or employees, to discharge the vessel in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner?

To which the jury gave no answer.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 3 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 20

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence

that such failure, if any, resulted from a failure on the part of Strachan Shipping Company, its agents, servants or employees, to discharge the vessel in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner?

To which the jury gave no answer.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 5 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 21

Do you find that in discharging the No. 5 lower hold without the use of a bulldozer Strachan Shipping Company, its agents, servants or employees, failed to discharge said vessel in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner?

To which the jury gave no answer.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 7 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 22

Do you find that in discharging the No. 5 lower hold without the use of ore buckets Strachan Shipping Company, its agents, servants or employees, failed to discharge said vessel in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner?

To which the jury gave no answer.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 9 "We do," and only in that event, the answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 23

Do you find that in discharging the No. 5 lower hold without the use of skids Strachan Shipping Company, its agents, servants or employees, failed to discharge said vessel in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner?

To which the jury gave no answer.

If you have answered Special Issue No. 12 "We do," and only in that event, then answer:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 24

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was not the sole proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries, if any?

To which the jury answered "It was not the sole proximate cause."

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 25

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question the operator of Brown hoist No. 8 was not a loaned employee of Strachan Shipping Company?

To which the jury answered "He was not a loaned employee."

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 26

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and adequately compensate Plaintiff C. V. Rorie for the injuries sustained by him on September 6, 1960, or will in reasonable probability be caused in the future, as a direct and proximate result of occasion in question, taking into consideration the following elements of damage and none others:

a. Such sum of money, if any, as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for his loss of wages from September 6, 1960, until the present time;

b. Such sum of money, if any, as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for his loss of wage-earning capacity, if any, which he would, in reason-

able probability, sustain in the future beyond this date;

c. Such sum of money, if any, as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for the physical pain, if any, suffered by him from September 6, 1960, until the present time;

d. Such sum of money, if any, as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for the physical pain, if any, he will, in reasonable probability, sustain in the future beyond this date;

e. Such sum of money, if any, as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for the mental anguish humiliation suffered by him, if any, from September 6, 1960, until the present time;

f. Such sum of money, if any, as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for the mental anguish and humiliation, if any, which he will, in reasonable probability, suffer from the present time into the future?

To which the jury answered "$75,000.00."

And the Court having duly received said verdict and having ordered the same filed, thereafter the plaintiff and intervenor filed a motion for judgment and the defendant, City of Galveston, filed its Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto and to Disregard Certain Special Issues, and the Court being of the opinion that the motion of plaintiff and intervenor should be overruled and that the Motion of the City of Galveston should be granted;

It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that plaintiff and intervenor take nothing against the defendants, Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, and the City of Gal-

veston, and such defendants go hence without day and with their costs.

And the Court further finding that defendants, Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., are entitled to recover against cross-defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, for attorneys' fees, investigation, expenses and miscellaneous costs, incurred in defense of the plaintiff's suit, and, all parties agreeing that the Court may fix the reasonable amount of such cost, the Court finds that the reasonable cost thereof was $7,500.00, and that such amount was and is reasonable in the circumstances.

It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendants, Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., recover against Strachan Shipping Company the sum of $7,500.00, together with interest thereon from the date of this Judgment.

All other relief not herein specifically granted is in all things denied. All facts not found by the jury are here and now found by the Court in support of this Judgment.

To all of which action of the Court the plaintiff, the intervenor, defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., and cross-defendant Strachan Shipping Company in open Court duly excepted and gave notice of appeal to the First Court of Civil Appeals in Houston, Texas.

SIGNED and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1968.

W. E. STONE
Judge

THE STATE OF TEXAS,)
COUNTY OF GALVESTON.)

I, V. J. BENINATI, JR., Clerk of the District Court in and for the County of Galveston, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of a certain judgment and decree rendered by the District Court for the 56th Judicial District in and for Galveston County, Texas, on the 26th day of August, A.D. 1968 in Cause No. 96,190 entitled C. V. Rorie, Jr., Plaintiff, and Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd. et al, Defendant, and entered on the minutes of said Court on pages 233-241 of Book No. 122 as appears of record manifest in my office.

Witness, my official signature and seal of the said District Court at office in Galveston, Texas, this the 30th day of August, 1968.

V. J. BENINATI, JR.,
Clerk District Court, Galveston
County, Texas.

By ELIZABETH A. CROSBY,
Deputy Clerk.

(Seal)

THE

Supreme Court of Texas

Capitol Station

AUSTIN, TEXAS

78711

July 28, 1971

Mr. Robert Eikel, Attorney
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P. O. Box 629
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Re: C. V. Rorie, Jr. et al. vs.
City of Galveston
Supreme Court No. B-2326.

Gentlemen:

Enclosed you will find a copy of the judgment of our Court in the above numbered and entitled cause as it appears in the minutes of our Court.

Yours very truly,

GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk

EUGENE CERVENKA

By Eugene Cervenka, Deputy.

No. B-2326

C. V. Rorie, Jr. et al.

vs.

City of Galveston

From Galveston County, Fourteenth District.

This cause came on to be heard on writ of error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourteenth Supreme Judicial District and the original transcript and transcript showing the proceedings in the Court of Civil Appeals having been duly considered, because it is the opinion of the Court (Associate Justices Denton and Daniel not sitting) that there was error in the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, but no error in that of the District Court, it is, therefore, *adjudged, ordered* and *decreed* that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals be, and hereby is, reversed and set aside, and the judgment of the District Court be, and hereby is, affirmed.

It is further ordered that petitioner, C. V. Rorie, Jr., and his surety, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, and petitioner, Texas Employers Insurance Association, and its surety, Employers Casualty Company, pay three-fourths (3/4ths) of the costs expended and incurred in this Court and Court of Appeals, jointly and severally; that petitioner, Strachan Shipping Company, and its surety, Employers' Casualty Company, pay one-fourth (1/4th) of the costs expended and incurred in this Court and Court of Civil Appeals, and that this decision be certified to the District Court of Galveston County, Texas, for observance.

(Opinion of the Court by Ruel C. Walker, Associate Justice.)

Clerk, Supreme Court of Texas
Box J, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711

Messrs. Fulbright, Crooker and Jaworski, Attorneys
Bank of the Southwest Building
Houston, Texas 77002

Attn: Messrs. Dixie Smith &
Theodore Goller

CLERK'S OFFICE - SUPREME COURT
Austin, Texas, Oct. 13, 1971

Dear Sir:

You are hereby notified that the Motion for Rehearing in the case of RORIE ET AL. v. CITY OF GALVESTON, No. B-2326, was this day overruled.
(Both motions)

Very truly yours,

GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMEND. VII

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1257. State courts; appeal; certiorari

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 929.

RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Rule 19. Considerations governing review on certiorari

1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:

(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.

46 U.S.C.A. § 801. Definitions

When used in this chapter:

The term "other person subject to this chapter" means any person not included in the term "common carrier by water," carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water.

46 U.S.C.A. § 814. Contracts between carriers filed with Board

Every other person subject to this chapter, shall file immediately with the Federal Maritime Board a true copy of every agreement, with another such other person subject to this chapter, or modification or cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The term "agreement" in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrangements.

The Board may by order disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be in violation of this chapter, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations.

Agreements existing at the time of the organization of the Board shall be lawful until disapproved by the Board. It shall be unlawful to carry out any agreement or any portion thereof disapproved by the Board.

All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made after the organization of the Board shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the Board; and before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification, or cancellation.

46 U.S.C.A. § 816. Discriminatory rates prohibited; supervision by Board

Every other person subject to this chapter shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. Whenever the Board finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or practice.

46 C.F.R. § 533. Filing of Tariffs by Terminal Operators

§ 533.1 Scope

This part sets forth rules and regulations for the filing of terminal tariffs by persons engaged in carrying on the business of furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse or other terminal facilities . . . in connection with a common carrier by water in the foreign commerce of the United States . . .

§533.3 Persons who must file

Every person . . . carrying on the business of furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities as described in § 533.1, including, but not limited to terminals owned or operated by States and their political subdivisions . . . shall file in duplicate with the Bureau of Domestic Regulation, Federal Maritime Commission, and shall keep open to public inspection at all its places of business a schedule or tariff showing all its rates, charges, rules, and regulations relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, and/or delivering of property at its terminal facilities . . .

§ 533.6 Definitions

(d) Definitions of terminal services:

. . .

(10) Heavy lift: The service of providing heavy lift cranes and equipment for lifting cargo.

PLEADINGS

NO. 96,190

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

C. V. RORIE, JR.
v.
AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL

PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION

To The Honorable Judge Of Said Court:

COMES NOW C. V. RORIE, JR., hereinafter called Plaintiff, complaining of AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD.; TRINDER, ANDERSON & COMPANY, LTD.; and the CITY OF GALVESTON, its Mayor, HERBERT Y. CARTWRIGHT, and its Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, hereinafter called Defendants, and with leave of Court first had and obtained, files this his Fourth Amended Original Petition, alleging as follows:

I.

Defendant, Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., is a foreign corporation, organized and existing by virtue of law, but doing business in the State of Texas, and being engaged in interstate commerce. Defendant, Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., is a foreign corporation, organized and existing by virtue of law, but doing business in the State of Texas, and being engaged in interstate commerce. Defendant, Avenue Shipping Company, Ltd., is the owner

and/or operator of, and Defendant, Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., is the manager for said shipping company, of a fleet of vessels having regular routes from ports of the United States and foreign countries to ports in the State of Texas and particularly Galveston County, Texas, one of such vessels being the SS ARMAGH. On such regular trips the various vessels of the Defendants come into Texas ports, including the ports of Galveston County, Texas, and bring in and/or take out cargoes of various kinds. Said Defendants have an agent, to-wit: Strachan Shipping Company, U. S. National Bank Building, Galveston, Texas, where service of process may be had upon them in this cause.

The Defendant City of Galveston is a municipal corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas. In its proprietary capacity, the City of Galveston owns and operates the Galveston Wharves, through a Board of Trustees composed of certain elected and/or appointed persons and/or their successors in office, all of whom may be served with citation at the office of said Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves at 25th Street and Avenue I, Galveston, Texas. Said Defendant, City of Galveston, has a duly elected, qualified and acting Mayor-President, Herbert Y. Cartwright, upon whom service may be had in this cause.

II.

On or about September 6, 1960, Defendant City of Galveston in its proprietary capacity of owner and/or operator of the Galveston Wharves, through the above alleged Board of Trustees and/or their successors in office, was engaged in the business or function of owning, leasing, renting and/or operating shore-cranes and other

similar or related rigging equipment or machinery, and said Defendant had agents, servants and/or employees on its payroll for the purpose of operating said shore-cranes and said rigging equipment for profit in connection with loading and unloading ships in the area of the Galveston Wharves.

III.

On or about the 6th day of September, 1960, Plaintiff C. V. RORIE, JR., was employed as a longshoreman by Strachan Shipping Company, the contract stevedore, to discharge cargo from the SS ARMAGH, owned and operated by the Defendants; that at all times material hereto the Defendants, and each of them, as owners and operators of the SS ARMAGH, were duty bound to supply Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, with tools, machinery and equipment to permit him to perform his work of discharging the cargo from the holds of its vessel with safety. In connection therewith Plaintiff would show that Defendants had actual, as well as constructive, notice that ore bulk cargo was to be discharged from Hatch Number 5 of their vessel, by means of a shore based crane and placed into gondola cars stationed on the wharf alongside the Number 5 hatch. Plaintiff would show that at the time and on the occasion in question a substantial portion of the ore was stowed underneath the wings in the lower hold of the hatch, and that it could not be picked up by the clam bucket of the crane in a routine manner. Defendants were negligent in failing to provide a safe method of bringing the ore that was stowed in the wings of the hatch into the square of the hatch by means of equipment such as bulldozers and/or payloaders or other suitable equipment such as ore buckets or skids or slips,

where the steel bucket attached to the shore based crane could pick up the said cargo with safety to all those working in that area; Defendants, by and through their agents, servants and employees, were derelict in their absolute and non-delegable duty to supply tools and machinery to permit the safe moving of said cargo into the square of the hatch and failed to discharge their non-delegable duty, absolute in its nature, to supply Plaintiff with a safe place to work. The Defendants used or permitted to be used a scheme of employing the ship's winches and a snatch block to pull and/or bring the heavy steel bucket from the square of the hatch to the wings for the purpose of discharging the cargo.

Plaintiff further alleges that the method used in the discharge of the said cargo was dangerous to all those working in that area and particularly the Plaintiff herein, and constituted negligence of which the Defendants, and each of them, acting by and through their agents, servants and employees, had knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have had knowledge thereof,

Plaintiff would show your Honorable Court that on or about the 6th day of September, 1960, while Plaintiff was working in the lower hold of hatch number 5 in connection with the discharge of the cargo of ore, and because of the failure of the Defendants, and each of them, their agents, servants and employees, to supply tools and equipment with which to discharge the cargo with safety, your Plaintiff sustained serious injuries when the steel bucket struck a bulkhead and ricocheted into him while it was being swung toward the wings of the hatch from the center of the hatch.

IV.

Plaintiff would show that the injuries sustained by him on or about the 6th day of September, 1960, were caused and contributed to be caused by the negligence of the Defendants, Avenue Shipping Company, Ltd., and Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., and each of them, their master, officers, agents, servants and employees, and/or the failure to supply proper tools and equipment so as to permit Plaintiff to discharge his duty with safety, i.e., seaworthy appliances, and the improper and unsafe manner in which the ore was being discharged, in the following particulars, among others, to-wit:

(1) In failing to supply Plaintiff with a safe place in which to work.

(2) In failing to supply ore buckets, slips and/or skids to be used to bring the cargo of ore into the square of the hatch.

(3) In failing to supply a bulldozer or payloader to be lowered into the lower hold of hatch number 5 with which to move the cargo of ore into the square of the hatch.

(4) In permitting the discharge of the cargo of ore from the lower hold of hatch number 5 without the use of bulldozers or payloaders and/or suitable equipment and tools, such as slips, skids and/or ore buckets, to bring in or move the cargo into the square of the hatch.

(5) In failing to exercise that degree of care which would have been exercised by persons of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances to determine that the discharge operation was conducted with proper tools and equipment.

(6) Plaintiff would show that the Defendants, acting by and through their master, officers, agents and/or employees knew, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should have known that the discharge operation conducted at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit was not carried on in a safe manner and/or with proper tools and equipment so as to protect Plaintiff from unreasonable risk of harm, and that such failure constituted negligence.

(7) In negligently permitting the discharge of a cargo from underneath the wings of the forward portion of the lower hold of Hatch Number 5 without the use of ore buckets, bulldozers or payloaders, slips or skids.

(8) In negligently permitting the discharge of the cargo from underneath the wings of the forward portion of the lower hold of Hatch Number 5 by using the clam bucket and snatch block attachment.

(9) In negligently permitting the discharge of a cargo from underneath the wings of the forward portion of the lower hold of Hatch Number 5 without first bringing and/or moving said cargo into the inshore portion of the square of Hatch Number 5.

Plaintiff states that each and all of the foregoing facts, conditions, circumstances and acts of omission, as well as commission, constituted negligence on the part of the said Defendants, its or their agents, servants and employees, and the failure to use ordinary care, and each and all, taken singularly and in conjunction with each other, proximately caused and contributed to cause, in whole or in part, Plaintiff's injuries and resulting complications, disabilities and damages of which he herein complains.

V.

Plaintiff would further show that the SS ARMAGH was unseaworthy in that the Defendants breached their absolute and non-delegable duty to provide tools and equipment that would permit Plaintiff to discharge his duties in safety and/or to provide tools and equipment so as to protect him and all others similarly situated from unreasonable risk of harm.

In connection therewith Plaintiff would show that the Defendants had an absolute and non-delegable duty to supply tools and equipment as to permit the work to be done with reasonable safety to him and to protect him from unreasonable risk of harm. That the failure of the Defendants, their agents, servants and employees, to supply a crane free of defects and in proper working condition and/or to supply either a bulldozer, payloader and/or other equipment, such as ore buckets, slips and/or skids for moving the cargo to the square of the hatch where the bucket attached to the shore based crane could lift the same, rendered the vessel unseaworthy, by reason of which Plaintiff suffered the injuries hereinafter more fully set out.

VI.

Plaintiff would further show that the Defendant, City of Galveston, acting by and through its servants, agents and employees, for a valuable consideration agreed to and did lease the crane and an operator to operate said crane in connection with the discharge of ore cargo from the Number 5 hatch of the SS ARMAGH. That said Defendant, acting by and through its said operator, was negligent in the operation of such crane causing Plaintiff's injuries in the following respects:

(1) In negligently swinging the bucket attached to said crane so that it would strike portions of the steel structure of the hatch of said vessel which in turn ricocheted wildly in said hatch, striking Plaintiff.

(2) In operating said crane without first receiving a signal from the signal man.

(3) In negligently operating and/or swinging the clam bucket attached to said crane so that it would strike portions of the steel structure of said hatch.

(4) In negligently operating the crane so as to cause the clam bucket to strike the steel structure of Hatch Number 5.

(5) In moving the clam bucket without a signal from the signal man.

Plaintiff states that each and all of the foregoing facts, conditions, circumstances and acts of omission, as well as commission, constituted negligence on the part of the said Defendant, its agents, servants and employees, and all and each, taken singularly or in conjunction with each other, proximately caused, or contributed to be caused, in whole or in part, Plaintiff's injuries and resulting complications, disabilities and damages of which he herein complains.

VII.

In the alternative, and in the event Plaintiff is mistaken in any or all of the acts of negligence against the Defendant, City of Galveston, or the exact cause which brought about the movement of the clam bucket so as to strike Plaintiff, then Plaintiff alleges that the actual control and operation of said crane at the time and on the occasion in question was under the Defendant, its agents, servants

and employees other than Plaintiff. Plaintiff, as a member of the longshore gang in the lower hold of Hatch No. 5, was not in a position to know how said crane was operated at the time and on the occasion made the basis of this suit, and what caused the said clam bucket to move suddenly without a signal with such force so as to strike the steel structure of the lower hold of Hatch No. 5 and swing so as to strike Plaintiff. That Defendant, City of Galveston, through its agents, servants and/or employees knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care at the time and on the occasion in question should have known and could have known of the condition of said crane and the method and manner of its operation. Such facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the Defendant, its agents, servants and employees, or in the exercise of ordinary care they should have known of the same, but the Plaintiff does not know, nor was he in a position to know, the condition of the said crane or its method and manner of operation, the condition of its brakes, lever or whatever method there is in operating said crane in order that it may operate in a proper fashion without striking the steel structure of Hatch No. 5 and/or Plaintiff or others similarly situated. In any event, Plaintiff alleges that he does not know and is not in a position to know the exact cause of said bucket swinging with such force against the steel structure of the lower hold of Hatch No. 5 and its subsequent movement so as to strike Plaintiff, injuring him; and Plaintiff alleges that such a condition does not ordinarily take place, and that if the Defendant and those operating said crane would have exercised ordinary care in the operation and maintenance of said crane, the clam bucket and its attachments, or make timely and proper inspection of same, the sudden swinging of said clam bucket would

not have taken place; that there is no other cause for the sudden swinging and striking of said clam bucket against the steel structure of said hatch except that the condition of said clam bucket, its attachments, brakes, levers were defective and/or the negligent act or acts or omission of the Defendant, its agents, servants and employees or those acting for them. Because of the peculiar situation surrounding the circumstances of the injuries of Plaintiff, Plaintiff was unable to know, and does not know the exact cause of said sudden swinging movement of said clam-bucket which struck and injured him. Therefore, Plaintiff puts the Defendant, City of Galveston, on notice that he does not rely exclusively on the allegations of negligence, or the acts of negligence hereinabove alleged, but in the alternative, relies on the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*, i.e., that the circumstances under which Plaintiff was injured speak for themselves as a grounds for recovery herein.

VIII.

Plaintiff would show that by reason of the injuries above alleged, he has suffered serious and painful injuries to his body, consisting of, among other things, a compound fracture of the lower left femur of the left leg, injuring the bones, ligaments, tendons, cartilages, etc., of his left leg; that by reason of such injuries he has been hospitalized a number of times and has undergone operations on at least three different occasions. That he has suffered injury to his back and in any event, the injuries sustained as above alleged caused deformities of his body, instability of his back, impairment of his circulatory system and other serious and painful injuries, as a result of which

he was unable o work from the date of his injuries to the date of the filing of this amended petition and will be unable to work for the rest of his life.

That by reason of the injuries above alleged, Plaintiff suffered, suffers and will continue to suffer extreme pain and mental anguish and will suffer pain, mental anguish and humiliation for the rest of his life. Plaintiff would show that at the time of his injuries he was a young, robust, strong man, 40 years of age with a life expectancy of 35 years; that by reason of the injuries sustained as above alleged he will no longer be able to work and earn money; that his ability to earn a living has been totally impaired and destroyed, all to his damage in the sum of One Hundred Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($125,000).

IX.

Plaintiff would further show that by reason of the injuries sustained, as above alleged, he has been confined in hospitals incurring expenses for medical care and attention, operations, drugs, etc. That such hospitalization, medical care and attention, hospital bills, operating rooms, anesthesia, medical bills, etc., he had to spend and/or has become obligated to spend to the time of the filing of this amended petition the sum of approximately Four Thousand One Hundred Twenty-one and 96/100 Dollars ($4,121.96).

Plaintiff would show that the medical treatment, hospitalization, physiotherapy treatment and medicines received by him were necessary and the charges made therefor were reasonable and the usual and customary charges made by the medical profession, hospitals, physiotherapists,

drug stores, etc., in Galveston County, Texas. That in all probability he will need further medical care and attention in the future and the reasonable cost thereof will be in the approximate sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff prays that citation issue and be served upon the said Defendants to appear and answer herein, and upon final hearing hereof, Plaintiff prays judgment against said Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, for his damages as above alleged in the total amount of One Hundred Thirty-four Thousand One Hundred Twenty-one and 96/100 Dollars ($134,121.96), together with interest thereon from the date of such injuries or from the date of judgment, all costs of Court, and all such other and further relief, whether general or special, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled in the premises.

MANDELL & WRIGHT

By ARTHUR J. MANDELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
707 South Coast Building
Houston, Texas 77002

PLAINTIFF HEREBY REQUESTS TRIAL BY JURY

NO. 96,190

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

C. V. RORIE, JR.

v.

AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL

DEFENDANT CITY OF GALVESTON'S FIRST AMENDED ANSWER

(Filed June 17, 1966)

TO THE SAID HONORABLE COURT:

COMES NOW City of Galveston, its Mayor, and its Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, and file this their First Amended ~~Original~~ Answer to plaintiff's petition on file herein:

I.

Defendants adopt by reference the Plea in Abatement contained in these defendants' original answer.

II.

Defendants specially except to plaintiff's petition and to the portions and for the reasons hereinafter stated:

(1) To the petition as a whole, because it states no cause of action against the Mayor or the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, and the petition shows on its face that the City of Galveston is the only proper party, insofar as the operation of the Wharves is concerned.

(2) To the allegations in amended page 6 of plaintiff's third amended petition, wherein it is alleged that defend-

ant City of Galveston "negligently failed to operate said crane in a safe manner so that same would not swing", because the same is a conclusion of law and a conclusion of the pleader and is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to apprise the defendant of the proof that it will be required to meet, in that it is not stated in what respect or in what manner the defendant was negligent.

(3) To the allegations in sub-paragraph (2b) of Paragraph VI and amended page 6 of plaintiff's third amended petition, wherein it is alleged that this defendant negligently failed to keep and maintain the crane "in a proper working condition and in breaching its warranty that said crane was in proper working condition", because the same is a conclusion of law and a conclusion of the pleader and is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to apprise the defendant of the proof that it will be required to meet, in that it is not stated in what respect or in what manner the crane was not in a proper working condition and it is not stated in what respect the warranty was breached and it is not stated what the warranty was.

Of each and all of which special exceptions defendants pray judgment of the Court.

III.

Subject to the foregoing, and without waiving the same, these defendants deny each and every, all and singular, the allegations contained in plaintiff's petition and demand strict proof thereof.

IV.

Defendants allege that plaintiff at the time and place and on the occasion in question failed to keep a proper

lookout and failed to take steps to avoid being struck, and that such failure proximately caused or contributed to cause the accident in question and the damages, if any, to plaintiff.

V.

These defendants allege that at the time and place and on the occasion in question the crane was being operated by persons who at that time were loaned servants of Strachan Shipping Company, and were acting under the direction and supervision of Strachan Shipping Company, and that Strachan Shipping Company is responsible for any acts of the operators of the said crane at the time and place and on the occasion in question. In this connection the defendants would show that Galveston Wharves duly enacted, published, and filed Tariff Circular 4-B, effective January 10, 1960, and which was in effect at the time of this alleged accident and Strachan Shipping Company rented said crane and the operators under Item No. 155 of said Tariff. Said Tariff provided specifically in Item No. 97 thereof as follows:

> "When cranes, derricks, hoists, conveyors, lift trucks, trucks, tractors, etc., are rented or leased to others, it is expressly understood that the unit will be operated under the direction and control of the lessee and the lessee shall be responsible for the operation thereof, and the lessee assumes all risks for injuries or damages which may arise or grow out of the use or operation of said unit.
>
> "It is hereby understood and agreed that in the event lessee uses the operator of said unit employed by the Galveston Wharves, such operator shall be under the direction of the lessee and the operator shall be

considered as the agent or servant of the lessee and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such operator during the time of rental or lease. It is incumbent upon the lessee to make a thorough inspection and satisfy himself as to the physical condition and capacity of the unit, as well as the competency of the operator, there being no representation or warranties with reference to such matters."

VI.

Defendants allege that Strachan Shipping Company, acting by and through its employees, agents and servants in the course of their employment were the sole proximate cause of the accident in question.

WHEREFORE, having fully answered, these defendants pray judgment of the Court that plaintiff take nothing by reason of his suit against these defendants, and that these defendants go hence without day and with their costs.

McLEOD, ALEXANDER,
POWEL & APFFEL

By: _____
V. W. McLeod
808 Sealy & Smith
Professional Bldg.
Galveston, Texas
Attorneys For Defendants.
City of Galveston, Its Mayor, and
the Board of Trustees of
Galveston Wharves

CROSS-ACTION

These defendants adopt by reference the cross-action contained in their original answer.

McLEOD, ALEXANDER,
POWEL & APFEL

By _____
V. W. McLeod
808 Sealy & Smith
Professional Bldg.
Galveston, Texas
Attorneys For Defendants
And Cross Plaintiffs,
City of Galveston, Its Mayor, and
the Board of Trustees of
Galveston Wharves

NO. 96,190

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
56TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

C. V. RORIE

VS.

AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL

DEFENDANT CITY OF GALVESTON'S ANSWER AND CROSS-ACTION

(Filed April, 1961)

TO THE SAID HONORABLE COURT:

COME NOW City of Galveston, its Mayor, and its Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, hereinafter some times for convenience called "Galveston Wharves", and file this their original answer to plaintiff's petition on file herein:

I.

PLEA IN ABATEMENT

That this defendant, City of Galveston, which is the only proper party among these defendants, specially pleads that the plaintiff herein did not have the right to and cannot bring his suit and cause of action against this defendant for the reasons that said plaintiff is not authorized under the circumstances to sue this defendant; said plaintiff has failed to comply with the hereinafter quoted provisions of the Code of the City of Galveston, Texas; that compliance with such provisions is a condition precedent to any action herein, if any such exists, and by

reason of the facts hereinafter alleged, this suit and cause of action may be abated. In this connection, this defendant specially pleads that the Board of Commissioners of the City of Galveston on December 27, 1956, and at a time prior to the accrual of any alleged cause of action in favor of the plaintiff duly passed, adopted and published as required by law, Section 15 and 15A of the Code of the City of Galveston reading as follows:

"BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF GALVESTON:

SECTION 1: Chapter 1 of the Code of the City of Galveston, 1948, is hereby amended by adding thereto Section 15 and 15A, to read as follows:

Section 15: Notice of Claim Against City for Damages.

Before the City of Galveston shall be liable for damages for personal injuries of any kind, or for damages for death of any person or persons, or for injuries to or destruction of property of any kind, the person injured, or those entitled to claim by law for wrongful death, or the owner of the property injured or destroyed, or someone in his behalf, shall give the Board of Commissioners notice in writing of such injury, death or destruction, duly verified within thirty (30) days after the same has been sustained, stating in such written notice when, where and how the injury, death, or destruction occurred, and the apparent extent thereof, the amount of damage sustained, the amount for which claimant will settle, the actual residence of the claimant by street and number at the date the claim is presented, and the actual residence of such claimant for six (6) months immediately preceding the occurrence of such injuries, death, or destruction, and the names and

addresses of the witnesses upon whom he relies to establish his claim, and a failure to so notify the Board of Commissioners within the time and in the manner specified herein shall exonerate, excuse and exempt the City from any liability whatsoever.

Section 15A. Neither the Mayor, any individual commissioner, nor any other officer or employee of the City of Galveston shall have authority to waive any of the provisions of the foregoing Section 15 of Chapter 1 of the Code of the City of Galveston, 1948, but same may be waived only by resolution of the Board of Commissioners of the City of Galveston, made and passed before the expiration of said period of thirty (30) days provided for in said section above, and which resolution shall be evidenced by the minutes and records of said City Commission.

Section 2: This Ordinance shall be effective from and after its adoption and publication as required by law."

That prior to September 6, 1960, the said above described Ordinances have been duly passed, adopted and published as required by law and prior to September 6, 1960, the date of the alleged injury to the plaintiff, and were in full force and effect as valid and existing Ordinances of the City of Galveston; that plaintiff herein is claiming personal injuries against this defendant and failed to and did not give notice in writing of any such injury, which is the subject matter of this suit within thirty (30) days after the same had been sustained and, in fact, did not give any notice at all as required by Section 15 of the Code of the City of Galveston. Specifically, plaintiff herein failed to and did not give the Board of Commissioners of the City of Galveston notice in writing of any

such alleged injury, duly verified, within thirty (30) days after said injury was alleged to have been sustained and consequently, plaintiff, not having given such notice and not stating in any such notice when, where and how the alleged injuries occurred or the apparent extent thereof or the amount of damage sustained, or the amount for which the claimant would settle, or the actual residence of the claimant, or the actual residence of such claimant six (6) months immediately preceding the occurrence of such alleged injury or the names and addresses of the witnesses upon which the plaintiff relies to establish his claim, and this defendant further specially pleads that by reason of the failure to comply with Section 15 and Section 15A of the Ordinances of the City of Galveston under the Code of the City of Galveston, plaintiff herein was not entitled to maintain this action and it should in all respects be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, this defendant, City of Galveston, respectfully prays that its Plea in Abatement be sustained and that this cause be dismissed.

II.

Subject to the foregoing, and without waiving the same, these defendants deny each and every, all and singular, the allegations contained in plaintiff's petition and demand strict proof thereof.

III.

Defendants allege that plaintiff at the time and place and on the occasion in question failed to exercise the care that an ordinary prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances and that such

failure proximately caused or contributed to cause the accident in question and the damages, if any, to plaintiff.

IV.

These defendants allege that at the time and place and on the occasion in question the crane was being operated by persons who at that time were loaned servants of Strachan Shipping Company, and were acting under the direction and supervision of Strachan Shipping Company, and that Strachan Shipping Company is responsible for any acts of the operators of the said crane at the time and place and on the occasion in question. In this connection the defendants would show that Galveston Wharves duly enacted, published, and filed Tariff Circular 4-B, effective January 10, 1960, and which was in effect at the time of this alleged accident and Strachan Shipping Company rented said crane and the operators under Item No. 155 of said Tariff. Said Tariff provided specifically in Item No. 97 thereof as follows:

> "When cranes, derricks, hoists, conveyors, lift trucks, trucks, tractors, etc., are rented or leased to others, it is expressly understood that the unit will be operated under the direction and control of the lessee and the lessee shall be responsible for the operation thereof, and the lessee assumes all risks for injuries or damages which may arise or grow out of the use or operation of said unit.
>
> "It is hereby understood and agreed that in the event lessee uses the operator of said unit employed by the Galveston Wharves, such operator shall be under the direction of the lessee and the operator shall be considered as the agent or servant of the lessee and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such opera-

tor during the time of rental or lease. It is incumbent upon the lessee to make a thorough inspection and satisfy himself as to the physical condition and capacity of the unit, as well as the competency of the operator, there being no representation or warranties with reference to such matters."

V.

Defendants allege that Strachan Shipping Company, acting by and through its employees, agents and servants in the course of their employment were the sole proximate cause of the accident in question.

WHEREFORE, having fully answered, these defendants pray judgment of the Court that plaintiff take nothing by reason of his suit against these defendants, and that these defendants go hence without day and with their costs.

McLEOD, MILLS, SHIRLEY
& ALEXANDER

By s/ V. W. McLEOD
V. W. McLeod
801 Santa Fe Building
Galveston, Texas

Attorneys for Defendants,
City of Galveston, its Mayor, and
the Board of Trustees of Galveston
Wharves

THE STATE OF TEXAS)
COUNTY OF GALVESTON)

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared V. W. McLeod, who being by me duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says that he is the attorney of record for the above named defendants and as such is authorized to make this affidavit and that the facts and statements made in the foregoing Plea in Abatement (Paragraph 1) are true and correct.

s/ V. W. McLEOD

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by the said V. W. McLeod this 20th day of April, 1961, to certify which witness my hand and seal of office.

(Seal)

s/ Florence D. LaGrange
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for
Galveston, County, Texas

CROSS-ACTION

And now becoming actor, City of Galveston, its Mayor, the Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, and file this their cross-action against Strachan Shipping Company, a corporation, and a person not heretofore a party to this suit, and for grounds therefor would respectfully show the Court the following:

I.

Strachan Shipping Company is a corporation authorized to do business in the State of Texas, with an agent in Galveston, Galveston County, Texas, upon whom service of citation may be had for such corporation.

II.

The City of Galveston and the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves on September 6, 1960, did lease a crane to Strachan Shipping Company. That such crane was leased under the terms of Section 155 of Tariff Circular 4-B of the Galveston Wharves, which Tariff Circular was duly enacted, published and filed by the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, and which was in effect at all times material hereto. That said leasing arrangement under Section 155 was for the crane and also the operators and under Item 97 of such Tariff it was specifically provided as follows:

> "When cranes, derricks, hoists, conveyors, lift trucks, trucks, tractors, etc., are rented or leased to others, it is expressly understood that the unit will be operated under the direction and control of the lessee and the lessee shall be responsible for the operation thereof, and the lessee assumes all risks for injuries or damages which may arise or grow out of the use or operation of said unit.
>
> "It is hereby understood and agreed that in the event lessee uses the operator of said unit employed by the Galveston Wharves, such operator shall be under the direction of the lessee and the operator shall be considered as the agent or servant of the lessee and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such op-

erator during the time of rental or lease. It is incumbent upon the lessee to make a thorough inspection and satisfy himself as to the physical condition and capacity of the unit, as well as the competency of the operator, there being no representation or warranties with reference to such matters."

III.

That at the time and place and on the occasion in question the operators of said crane were under the direction and supervision and control of Strachan Shipping Company, and were so acting under the direction, supervision and control of Strachan Shipping Company and thereby became in law employees of Strachan Shipping Company and for whose actions Strachan Shipping Company became responsible.

IV.

That the said crane operators were taking directions as to how to operate the crane from an employee of Strachan Shipping Company and the crane was operated in accordance with directions and supervision of such employee of Strachan Shipping Company.

V.

That if there was any negligence in causing the accident in question that it was due to an act and by virtue of the acts of employees of Strachan Shipping Company operating in the course and scope of their employment.

VI.

That under the terms of said leasing agreement and by virtue of the fact that the crane was being operated by

and under the direction and control and pursuant to the orders of the employees of Strachan Shipping Company, Strachan Shipping Company is in law obligated to indemnify and save harmless these cross-plaintiffs from any amounts that may be awarded against these defendants, together with the costs of Court, expenses of investigation, and reasonable attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, these cross-plaintiffs pray that they have recovery of and from Strachan Shipping Company for any amount that may be awarded in favor of plaintiff against these cross-plaintiffs, and that these cross-plaintiffs recover of and from Strachan Shipping Company their costs of Court, expenses of investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, which at this time the cross-plaintiffs are unable to state accurately, but which they estimate to be in the sum of Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($5,000.00), and that these cross-plaintiffs have such other and further relief, general and special, in law and in equity, to which they may be entitled against Strachan Shipping Company.

McLEOD, MILLS, SHIRLEY & ALEXANDER

By /s/ V. W. McLEOD
V. W. McLeod
801 Santa Fe Building
Galveston, Texas

ATTORNEYS FOR CROSS-PLAINTIFFS, City of Galveston, its Mayor, and the Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY
56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS

* * *

NO. 96,190

C. V. RORIE, Plaintiff
v.
AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL, Defendants

(Filed February 16, 1968)

FIRST AMENDED ANSWER TO CROSS-ACTION OF DEFENDANT CITY OF GALVESTON AND CROSS-ACTION OF STRACHAN SHIPPING COMPANY

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

NOW COMES Strachan Shipping Company, and for first amended answer to the cross-action of the defendant City of Galveston would respectfully show as follows:

1.

By way of special exceptions, cross-defendant would respectfully urge:

(a) Cross-plaintiff's cross-action does not state a cause of action at law against cross-defendant and cross-defendant prays that the petition accordingly be dismissed with costs.

(b) Cross-defendant excepts to that portion of Paragraph II of the cross-action which refers to and

quotes from Item 97 of Tariff Circular 4-B of the Galveston Wharves for the reason that said Item 97 of the said Tariff is invalid, null, void, inoperative and legally unenforceable as a matter of law, and said provision is constitutionally unenforceable and invalid because it constitutes an undue burden on interstate and foreign commerce and is an attempt by cross-plaintiff by unilateral action and monopolistic control to shift its own liability for the negligence of its employees and the lack of reasonable fitness of its equipment to this cross-defendant, without consideration therefor, to cross-defendant's prejudice. Alternatively, cross-defendant says the said tariff provision is invalid until determined valid by an appropriate administrative agency.

Of which special exceptions, cross-defendant prays judgment of the Court, together with costs.

2.

Without waiving the foregoing special exceptions, but still insisting upon the same, for further answer herein, if any be necessary, cross-defendant denies each and every, all and singular, the allegations in said cross-action contained, and demands strict proof thereof.

3.

For further answer herein, if any be necessary, and without waiving the foregoing special exceptions and general denial, cross-defendant would respectfully show that in the event that it be found as alleged by cross-plaintiff that the plaintiff's alleged injuries were sustained as

a proximate result of cross-defendant's employee's negligence, that cross-defendant can in no wise be held liable, because plaintiff at the time of his alleged injury was an employee of cross-defendant and cross-defendant had at the time of said alleged injuries fully complied with the laws of the State of Texas and of the United States by providing workmen's compensation insurance to compensate plaintiff for injuries such as he allegedly received, and hence as a matter of law and fact this cross-defendant cannot be held liable to plaintiff and is not liable to either plaintiff or defendant, the plaintiff and the negligent party both being employees of cross-defendant.

4.

For further answer herein, if any be necessary, and without waiving the foregoing special exceptions and general denial, and special plea, cross-defendant would respectfully show in the alternative by way of special defense that if it be mistaken in its special plea that it is not liable to plaintiff or cross-plaintiff because of having complied fully with the laws of the State of Texas and of the United States by providing workmen's compensation insurance to compensate plaintiff for the injuries, if any, then cross-defendant would show it is in no way liable to cross-plaintiff because the tariff provisions relative to the crane and crane operator quoted in paragraph II of the cross-action are void and unconstitutional as against public policy, and are inoperative and void by reason of unlawful business compulsion in that cross-defendant was unable to obtain use of the said crane except under the said tariff provisions, the cross-defendant being permitted to use on the occasion in question no other crane than that of cross-plaintiff (Galveston Wharves), and

none other being available, said tariff provisions hence being illegal, null, void, inoperative, and legally unenforceable, and affording no basis for the claim now made by cross-plaintiff against cross-defendant by way of this cross-action.

5.

For further answer herein, if any be necessary, and without waiving the foregoing special exceptions and general denial, and the foregoing special pleas, cross-defendant would show by way of special denial that it in no wise made any agreement to indemnify cross-plaintiff against any suits or claims such as that herein sued upon, that it in no wise and at no time agreed to hold cross-plaintiff harmless against any claims or suits of any kind, including those herein asserted and sued upon, and it expressly denies accordingly any and all liability to cross-plaintiff as well as to plaintiff.

CROSS-CLAIM

And now by way of cross-action against defendant City of Galveston (hereinafter called City), cross-plaintiff Strachan Shipping Company (hereinafter called Strachan) would respectfully show as follows:

1.

That on or about September 6, 1960, Strachan Shipping Company was engaged by the owners and/or charterers of the M/S ARMAGH to discharge a cargo of bulk ore from said vessel, which was then moored in the Port of Galveston, Texas. Strachan then engaged the City of Galveston, as an independent contractor, to furnish for the

said work of discharging the ore from the SS ARMAGH a shore-based crane, which operated on railroad tracks on the wharves of the City, together with an employee of the City to operate the said crane during the discharging operations.

2.

When the crane and its operator reached shipside the discharging operations commenced and continued without event until most of the ore had been removed from the ship's No. 5 lower hold, when suddenly and without warning the operator of the crane, the servant of the City, carelessly and negligently dropped the clamshell bucket of the crane into the No. 5 lower hold allowing it to strike a bulkhead or the vessel's propeller shaft tunnel, which deflected it into the wings of the hold and caused it to strike and injure the plaintiff.

3.

Cross-plaintiff would show that the City of Galveston, in its proprietary capacity, sole owner and operator of the Galveston Wharves, and the railroad cranes and other equipment thereon, was engaged in the business of owning, leasing, renting and operating land-based railway cranes and other similar equipment on its premises and furnishing its servants and employees as operators of said cranes, all of such operations being conducted for profit in the furtherance of the business of the said City of Galveston in its proprietary capacity; and that no other persons, firms or corporations are permitted by the said City of Galveston to own or operate railway cranes in the Port of Galveston, such ownership and operations being a non-

competitive monopoly which the City of Galveston has reserved solely unto itself.

4.

The City of Galveston, on the occasion in question, had sole supervision and control and right of supervision and control over the crane and its operator, and Strachan Shipping Company had no control or right of control over the crane and its operator, was not permitted to furnish its own operator and did not supervise the work of the crane and its operator in any respect. If the plaintiff was injured through any cause other than his own negligent conduct, such injuries were proximately caused solely and in part by the negligent operation of the crane by the City of Galveston's servant or the failure of the City to furnish a crane reasonably fit for its intended purposes.

5.

Under the said rental agreement and the applicable law the City of Galveston warranted that it would perform its work of discharging the ore from the SS ARMAGH in a proper and workmanlike manner, and that the railroad crane furnished by it would be reasonably fit for that purpose, and that the operator thereof, the servant of the City of Galveston, would possess knowledge and skills equal to others in his calling sufficient to perform the assigned work in a proper and workmanlike manner. If plaintiff was injured on the occasion in question and his injuries resulted from the fault of anyone other than himself, which is not admitted, then such injuries resulted from the failure of City of Galveston to perform its services in the discharge of the cargo from the vessel in a

good and workmanlike manner, which was a breach of its warranty to Strachan and Strachan is therefore entitled to have indemnity against the City of Galveston for the full amount of any judgment which may be rendered against it herein, together with its costs, disbursements and attorneys' fees.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Strachan Shipping Company prays that upon trial hereof judgment be entered herein that the cross-plaintiffs City of Galveston and Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd., take nothing against it by their cross-actions herein against Strachan Shipping Company, and that Strachan Shipping Company have its costs herein, or in the alternative, Strachan Shipping Company, as cross-plaintiff, prays that in the event any judgment be rendered against it herein, that it be given judgment over against the City of Galveston for any sums for which it may be liable herein, together with its disbursements and attorneys' fees herein expended and costs of court, and for such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

EIKEL & GOLLER

By THEODORE GOLLER
205 Oil & Gas Building
Houston, Texas 77002
Attorneys for Strachan
Shipping Company

NO. 96,190

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY
56th Judicial District of Texas

C. V. RORIE, JR.
v.
AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL.

FIRST AMENDED ANSWER TO CROSS-ACTION OF DEFENDANTS AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., AND TRINDER ANDERSON & CO., LTD., AND CROSS-ACTION OF STRACHAN SHIPPING COMPANY

To The Honorable Judge Of Said Court:

NOW COMES Strachan Shipping Company, and for first amended answer to the cross-action of defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd., would respectfully show as follows;

1.

By way of special exception, cross-defendant would respectfully urge that the cross-action of Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd., does not state a cause of action at law against this cross-defendant and cross-defendant prays that the cross-claim accordingly be dismissed with costs.

2.

Without waiving the foregoing special exception, but still insisting upon the same, for further answer herein, if any be necessary, Cross-defendant denies each and every, all and singular, the allegations in said cross-claim contained, and demands strict proof thereof.

3.

Without waiving the foregoing special exception or general denial, for further answer herein, if any be necessary, this cross-defendant would show that if the plaintiff was injured, as alleged, which is not admitted but denied, such injuries, if any, proximately resulted in whole or in part from his own negligence in failing to stand clear of the area of the No. 5 lower hold of the SS ARMAGH where the clamshell bucket of the shoreside crane, owned and operated by defendant City of Galveston, was expected to land as it was lowered into the hold for the purpose of discharging ore.

4.

For further answer, if any be necessary, and without waiving the foregoing special exception, general denial and special pleas, this cross-defendant would show that the plaintiff's injuries, if any, were the result of an unavoidable accident.

5.

For further answer herein, if any be necessary, and without waiving the foregoing pleas, or any of them, this cross-defendant would show that if the plaintiff was injured through any cause other than his own negligent conduct, such injuries were proximately caused solely by the failure of the defendant City of Galveston to provide a reasonably safe crane and the negligent acts and conduct of the City's employee in the operation of said crane. Alternatively, such failure of the said defendant to furnish a reasonably safe crane and the negligence of its employee in the operation of said crane was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, if any.

6.

For further answer, if any be necessary, and without waiving the foregoing special exception, general denial or special pleas, this cross-defendant would show in the alternative that if the plaintiff was injured through any cause other than his own negligence or the failure of defendant City of Galveston to provide a reasonably safe crane or the negligence of the City's employee in the operation of said crane such injuries, if any were proximately caused by the failure of the cross-plaintiffs Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd., to furnish adequate and proper ship's tackle and gear for removal of the cargo of ore from the No. 5 lower hold of the SS ARMAGH with reasonable safety and the failure of said cross-plaintiffs to furnish Strachan's employees a reasonably safe place to work in the No. 5 lower hold of said vessel.

Strachan Shipping Company would further show that the cross-plaintiffs represented and warranted to it that the SS ARMAGH was suitable for discharge by mechanical equipment, and if it should be found that the No. 5 lower hold of the said vessel was not suitable for discharge of the cargo therefrom by mechanical equipment, the failure of the cross-plaintiffs to furnish a suitable vessel for mechanical discharge constituted a breach of said warranty and representations and the acquiescence of cross-plaintiffs in the method of discharge in effect at the time of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, constituted conduct sufficient to preclude the cross-plaintiffs from recovering indemnity herein from Strachan Shipping Company.

CROSS-CLAIM

And now by way of cross-action against defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd. (hereinafter called Avenue and Trinder Anderson) cross-plaintiff Strachan Shipping Company (hereinafter called Strachan) would respectfully show:

1.

That on or about August 1, 1960, prior to the arrival of the SS ARMAGH in the Port of Galveston, the cross-defendants Avenue and Trinder Anderson, through their duly authorized agents and representatives, represented and warranted to Strachan that the said vessel was suitable for the discharge of its cargo of bulk ore by mechanical equipment; and that in reliance upon such representations and warranties Strachan hired from the defendant City of Galveston mechanical equipment for use in such discharge consisting of a shore-based crane having attached a clam-shell bucket for scooping the ore from the holds of the vessel and loading it into railway cars on the dock, together with an operator, an employee and servant of the City.

The said crane and its operator were employed by Strachan for the discharge of this ore from the SS ARMAGH in reliance upon the said representations and warranties. If it should be found that the No. 5 lower hold of the SS ARMAGH was not suitable for discharge of the cargo of bulk ore therefrom by the aforesaid mechanical equipment, the failure of the cross-plaintiffs, Avenue and Trinder Anderson, to furnish a suitable vessel for mechanical discharge constituted a breach of the said

representations and warranties proximately causing the plaintiff's injuries, and in the event any judgment be entered against Strachan Shipping Company herein Strachan prays that it have judgment over against cross-defendants Avenue and Trinder Anderson for full indemnity for any sums it may be required to pay the plaintiff herein or defendant City of Galveston, including all disbursements and attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of their suits.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Strachan Shipping Company prays that upon trial hereof judgment be entered that defendants City of Galveston and Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd., take nothing against Strachan by their cross-action, and that Strachan have its costs herein; alternatively, Strachan Shipping Company, as cross-plaintiff, prays that in the event judgment be rendered against it herein, that it be given judgment over against Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd., for any sums for which it may be liable herein, together with its disbursements and attorneys' fees herein expended and costs of court, and for such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

EIKEL & GOLLER

By THEODORE GOLLER
205 Oil & Gas Building
Houston, Texas 77002
Attorneys for Strachan
Shipping Company

NO. 96,190

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON
COUNTY, TEXAS
56TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

C. V. RORIE
VS.
AVENUE SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD., ET AL

AMENDED PETITION IN INTERVENTION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

NOW COMES Texas Employers' Insurance Association, hereinafter styled intervenor, and files this its petition in intervention, with leave of the Court first obtained, and for such would respectfully show unto the Court;

I.

Other than your intervenor, the parties are set forth in plaintiff's original petition.

II.

Intervenor carried compensation insurance as set out in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. Sections 901 et seq., on Strachan Shipping Company when Rorie was injured in the course and scope of his employment with Strachan Shipping Company, in Galveston County, Texas, on or about September 6, 1960. Pursuant to its obligation to do so, intervenor has, as of February 16, 1968, paid out the total sum of TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE and 46/100 DOLLARS ($21,412.46) in com-

pensation and medical benefits to C. V. Rorie under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

III.

The allegations of negligence and unseaworthiness as contained in the plaintiff's original petition are for the purpose of this petition of intervention adopted. Under the terms and provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Texas Employers' Insurance Association is entitled to recover out of the first sums awarded plaintiff in his action against the defendants the amount of its expenditures for compensation, medical benefits furnished along with attorneys' fees in the reasonable amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED and No/100 DOLLARS ($2,500.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, intervenor prays that upon a trial it do have and recover its damages in the amount of $21,412.46, plus any additional compensation paid from December 23, 1965, until judgment is entered and reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of $2,500.00, and such other relief, both at law or in equity, to which intervenor is justly entitled.

FULBRIGHT, CROOKER, FREEMAN, BATES & JAWORSKI

By_____
Dixie Smith
Bank of the Southwest Building
Houston, Texas 77002 CA4-7070

Attorney for Intervenor, Texas Employers' Insurance Association

NO. 96,190

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON
COUNTY, TEXAS
56TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

C. V. RORIE
VS.
AVENUE SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD., ET AL

(Filed March 6, 1968)

STIPULATION OF COMPENSATION LIEN

COMES NOW C. V. Rorie, plaintiff; Avenue Shipping Company, Ltd., Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., defendants-third party plaintiffs, and the City of Galveston, its Mayor and its Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, defendants-cross defendants; and Strachan Shipping Company, third party defendant; by and through their attorneys of record, and hereby formally stipulate and agree as follows:

I.

On or about September 6, 1960, and at all times material hereto, plaintiff in this cause, C. V. Rorie, was an employee of third party defendant, Strachan Shipping Company; Strachan Shipping Company was an "employer" as the word is defined to mean in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. 901, et seq. Strachan Shipping Company secured the payment of compensation to its employees under said Act by subscribing to a policy of compensation insurance issued to it by Texas Employers' Insurance Association, which

policy was in full force and effect at the time of the accident made the basis of this suit, and the policy mentioned above provided coverage to Strachan Shipping Company for the benefit of its employees subject to the terms and provisions of the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

II.

On or about September 6, 1960, the plaintiff, C. V. Rorie, sustained injuries in the course of his employment for Strachan Shipping Company while engaged in maritime employment on navigable waters of the United States, which injuries are the basis of this suit; by reason of said injuries, Strachan Shipping Company's compensation insurance carrier, Texas Employers' Insurance Association, became liable to pay, and has paid compensation benefits and medical expenses to and for the benefit of plaintiff, C. V. Rorie, pursuant to its obligations under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers Compensation Act; and the said compensation benefits and medical expenses paid to and for the benefit of C. V. Rorie, were reasonable and necessary; as of February 16, 1968, Texas Employers' Insurance Association has become liable to pay and has paid weekly compensation benefits in the amount of $54.00 per week for 320 weeks, amounting to a sum of $17,280.00 in compensation benefits directly to C. V. Rorie and the sum of $4,132.46 in medical expenses for the benefit of C. V. Rorie, a total sum of $21,412.46.

III.

It is agreed that Texas Employers' Insurance Association waives its right to attorneys' fees which it might

otherwise be entitled as set out in its petition in intervention.

IV.

This stipulation and agreement is made solely for the purpose of establishing the rights of Texas Employers' Insurance Association in the event the plaintiff herein shows himself entitled to any recovery in this suit, and none of the terms of this stipulation may be used for any other purpose.

EXECUTED this 6th day of March, 1968, on behalf of plaintiff and his attorneys of record, Mandell & Wright.

By /s/ Arthur Mandell
ARTHUR MANDELL

EXECUTED this 6th day of March, 1968, on behalf of Avenue Shipping Company, Ltd., defendant-third party plaintiff and their attorneys, Royston, Rayzor & Cook.

By /s/ B F W
BRYAN WILLIAMS

EXECUTED this 6th day of March, 1968, on behalf of the City of Galveston, its Mayor, and its Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, defendants-cross defendants and their attorneys, McLeod, Alexander, Powell & Apffel.

By /s/ V. W. McLeod
V. W. McLEOD

EXECUTED this 6th day of March, 1968, on behalf of Strachan Shipping Company, third party defendant, and their attorney, Robert Eikel.

By /s/ Theodore Goller
ROBERT EIKEL

EXECUTED this 6th day of March, 1968, on behalf of Texas Employers' Insurance Association, intervenor and their attorneys, Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski.

By /s/ Dixie Smith
DIXIE SMITH

NO. 96,190

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

C. V. RORIE, JR.
v.
AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL

MOTION TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES TO MESSRS. MANDELL & WRIGHT FOR CREATING THE FUND

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COME NOW MANDELL & WRIGHT, attorneys, by and through Arthur J. Mandell, and respectfully move the Court to allow them a reasonable attorneys' fees for creating the fund for Intervenor Texas Employers' Insurance Association, thus making it possible to reimburse said Intervenor the sum of Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Twelve and 46/100 Dollars ($21,412.46) and in support thereof would respectfully show your Honorable Court as follows:

I

Your movants would respectfully show that Intervenor, Texas Employers' Insurance Association, pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Title 33, Sec. 901, et seq. has paid the sum of Seventeen Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Dollars ($17,280.00) as compensation to Plaintiff C. V.

Rorie, Jr. and Four Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Two and 46/100 Dollars ($4,132.46) for medical expenses by reason of the injuries sustained on September 6, 1960. The said C. V. Rorie, Jr., by and through his attorneys of record, Messrs. Mandell & Wright, filed what is generally termed a third party action against Avenue Shipping Company, Ltd., Trinder, Anderson & Co., Ltd., and the City of Galveston, seeking to recover compensatory damages and medical expenses. That your movants have done a great deal of work in the filing, preparation, appealing and trying said lawsuit and as a result of such effort have created a fund of Seventy-Nine Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Two and 46/100 Dollars ($79,132.46), out of which Intervenor Texas Employers' Insurance Association has been benefited by recovering the full amount of the monies expended under their obligation of the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Plaintiff would show that Plaintiff C. V. Rorie, Jr. has incurred expenses in the amount of $1,060.42 and has agreed to pay your movants herein as his attorneys, one-third of the total recovery of damages by reason of the injuries sustained on the occasion made the basis of this suit. Intervenor Texas Employers' Insurance Association did not seek, nor instituted any action for the recovery from these Defendants or anyone else seeking to recover these expenditures. That without such effort by Plaintiff and his attorneys' movements herein, Intervenor, Texas Employers' Insurance Association, could never have recovered these funds. Therefore, movants under the applicable law and equitable principles are entitled to the proportionate share of the attorneys' fees and expenses as the entire amount relates to the amount recovered by Texas Employers' Insurance Association.

In connection therewith, your movants would respectfully show that they have a contract with Plaintiff C. V. Rorie, Jr. wherein he agreed to pay one-third of the total amount that may be recovered in this cause of action. It would be unjust and unfair to place the entire liability of the efforts to recover these funds upon Plaintiff C. V. Rorie, Jr. Therefore, it is just, fair and equitable that Plaintiff's attorneys, Mandell & Wright, be awarded one-third as attorneys' fees of the Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Twelve and 46/100 Dollars ($21,412.46) and the proportionate share of the reasonable expenses incurred in the presentation of this case out of the funds awarded to Texas Employers' Insurance Association.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Court award Messrs. Mandell & Wright a proportionate share of the attorneys' fees commensurate with the amount awarded to Texas Employers' Insurance Association, plus a proportionate share of the costs of preparation in the trial of this case.

Respectfully Submitted,

MANDELL & WRIGHT

By_____
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
C. V. Rorie, Jr.

NO. 96,190

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

C. A. RORIE

v.

AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL

v.

STRACHAN SHIPPING COMPANY

SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER AND CROSS-ACTION OF DEFENDANTS AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., AND TRINDER ANDERSON & CO., LTD.

TO SAID HONORABLE COURT:

Now comes AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., and TRINDER ANDERSON & CO., LTD., defendants in the captioned cause, and file this their Second Amended Original Answer and Cross-Action as follows:

I.

These defendants specially except to Plaintiff's Third Amended Original Petition as a whole inasmuch as it does not allege the manner or way in which it is claimed any negligence of either of these defendants, or any unseaworthiness of the Vessel ARMAGH, caused or contributed to any of the injuries complained of by plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, defendants pray judgment of this special exception.

II.

These defendants further specially except to Plaintiff's

Third Amended Original Petition as a whole and to Paragraph III, IV and V thereof, insofar as they allege that these defendants owed an absolute and nondelegable duty to the plaintiff to provide a safe place to work and/or to provide tools and equipment which would permit or cause plaintiff to do his work without harm inasmuch as said allegation improperly describes the duty owed by these defendants to plaintiff, which was not a duty of insuring his safety but merely to provide him with a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for the purpose for which they were intended and to exercise reasonable care for his safety.

WHEREFORE, these defendants pray judgment on this special exception.

III.

These defendants deny each and every all and singular the allegations in plaintiff's petition contained and demand strict proof thereof and of this they put themselves upon the country.

IV.

Further answering if necessary, these defendants say that plaintiff's injuries, if any, resulted solely or, in the alternative, proximately from his own negligence in the following particulars among others:

(a) In failing to keep a ptoper lookout for his own safety.

(b) In failing to take a safe position in the hold so as to place himself as far away from the crane bucket as possible.

(c) In failing to observe the signals being given in connection with the operation of the crane or, in

the alternative, if it be found that plaintiff did observe such signals, in failing to heed them.

(d) In failing to watch the bucket carefully and to warn or alert those operating it of the possibility that it might strike some part of the vessel.

(e) In failing to arrange and agree with the signalman upon the proper signals to be used.

(f) In failing to see that the signalman gave plaintiff a sufficient period of time to remove himself to a position of safety prior to the crane bucket's entry into the hold.

(g) If it should be found that the method being utilized to discharge the cargo on the occasion in question was not reasonably safe, which is not admitted but denied, then plaintiff was negligent in failing to suggest this fact to the other members of the gang and or in continuing to expose himself to the unreasonable danger.

V.

Further answering, if necessary, these defendants say that plaintiff's injuries, if any, were the result of an unavoidable accident.

VI.

By way of cross-action against the impleaded defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, these defendants would show that the charterers of the Vessel ARMAGH had contracted and agreed with Strachan Shipping Company for the discharging of cargo from the Vessel ARMAGH on the occasion in question and that under the terms of said contract and the applicable law Strachan Shipping Company owed to these defendants, as beneficiaries of the aforesaid contract, the warranty that its services in the premises

would be performed in a workmanlike, reasonable and safe manner and these defendants say that if plaintiff was injured on the occasion in question and if his injury resulted from the fault of anyone other than himself, which is not admitted, then plaintiff's injuries resulted from the failure of Strachan Shipping Company to perform its services aboard the vessel in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner and further resulted from a breach by said Strachan Shipping Company of its warranty which runs to these defendants as aforesaid and these defendants therefore pray that in the event any judgment be entered against them they have judgment over against impleaded defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, by way of full indemnity and that in any event these defendants have judgment against Strachan Shipping Company for all costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by these defendants in their defense of plaintiff's suit.

VII.

By way of cross-action against the defendant, City of Galveston, and impleaded defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, these defendants would show that on the occasion in question said defendant City had agreed to provide a crane and the personnel necessary to operate the same to be utilized by the impleaded defendant Strachan Shipping Company, in connection with the discharging of the Vessel ARMAGH. These defendants say that if plaintiff was injured through any cause other then his own negligence it was as the proximate result of the failure of defendant City to provide a reasonably safe crane and or the proximate result of the fault and negligence of the defendant City and or those for whom it was responsible, or in the alternative said faults of defendant City combined, jointly and or

severally with the breach of the aforesaid implied warranty of impleaded defendant, Strachan Shipping Company; and these defendants therefore pray that in the event any judgment be rendered against them herein they have judgment over by way of full indemnity against the defendant City and impleaded defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, and that in any event they have judgment against the defendant City and Strachan Shipping Company for all costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of this suit.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, these defendants pray that upon trial hereof judgment be entered that plaintiff take nothing by his suit and that these defendants be allowed to go hence with their costs without day, or in the alternative, they pray that in the event any judgment be rendered against them, or either of them herein, that they be given joint and several judgment over against defendant, City of Galveston, and impleaded defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, and further pray that in any event they be given judgment against the impleaded defendant, Strachan Shipping Company, and defendant, City of Galveston, for all costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by these defendants in their defense against plaintiff's suit.

ROYSTON, RAYZOR & COOK

By BRYAN F. WILLIAMS
205 Cotton Exchange Building
Galveston, Texas
Attorneys for Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., and Trinder Anderson & Co., Ltd., Defendants

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 96,190

E. V. RORIE
v.
AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO OR TO DISREGARD THE JURY'S FINDINGS ON CERTAIN ISSUES

To The Said Honorable Court:

NOW COMES City of Galveston, one of the defendants in the above entitled and numbered matter, and files this its Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto, or, alternatively, to disregard the jury's findings on certain special issues and to enter Judgment for this defendant, for each and all of the following reasons:

I.

That as a matter of law Frank McPeters, the crane operator, was at the time of this accident a loaned servant. In this connection this defendant would point out to the Court that in December, 1959, effective January 1, 1960, the City of Galveston filed with the Federal Maritime Commission and sent to Strachan Shipping Company Galveston Wharves Tariff Circular No. 4-B, and Item 97 of said tariff provided:

"It is hereby understood and agreed that in the event lessee uses the operator of said unit employed by the

> Galveston Wharves, such operator shall be under the direction of the lessee and the operator shall be considered as the agent or servant of the lessee and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such operator during the time of rental or lease."

That the filing of the tariff, or in the alternative, the sending of the tariff to Strachan Shipping Company fixed the conditions under which the crane and operator were to be leased and such terms and conditions specifically provided that the operator shall be under the direction of Strachan Shipping Company and the operator shall be considered as the agent and servant of the lessee and the lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such operator during the time of rental or lease. That this became the agreement, understanding, and contract between the City of Galveston and Strachan Shipping Company and determines the question of whether or not Frank McPeters, the crane opertor, was the loaned servant of Strachan Shipping Company. Such cases as *Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Francis* (C.A.), 169 S.W.2d 286, err. ref., and *Steele v. Wells* (C.A.), 134 S.W.2d 377, err. ref., hold that where there is an arrangment whereby the operator is to be considered the loaned servant of the lessee that this controls. Here the filing of the tariff and the sending of the tariff to Strachan Shipping Company fixed the terms and conditions upon which the crane was to be leased and in taking and using the crane the provisions of such tariff became part of the contract between the City of Galveston and Strachan Shipping Company and this is a binding arrangement and as a matter of law determines that Frank McPeters, the crane operator, was the loaned servant of Strachan Shipping Company.

H.

The Court should disregard the jury's findings to Special Issues Nos. 18 and 25, because there is no evidence to support the jury's findings and as a matter of law for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph, Frank McPeters, the crane operator, was the loaned servant of Strachan Shipping Company and would be considered in law as being its servant at the time of this accident, rather than being the servant of the City of Galveston, the general employer.

WHEREFORE, the defendant, City of Galveston, respectfully prays that the Court set this Motion for hearing and on hearing hereof grant the Motion and enter a Judgment for the defendant, City of Galveston, Non Obstante Veredicto, or in the alternative, to disregard the jury's answers to Special Issues Nos. 18 and 25 and enter Judgment for the defendant, City of Galveston, that plaintiff take nothing by reason of his suit against the defendant, City of Galveston, and City of Galveston go hence without day and with its costs.

McLEOD, ALEXANDER,
POWEL & APFEL

By_____
V. W. McLeod
808 Sealy & Smith Professional
Building
Galveston, Texas
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFEND-
ANT,
City of Galveson

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 96,190

C. V. RORIE
v.
AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

COMES NOW C. V. RORIE, JR., Plaintiff in the above entitled and numbered cause and respectfully files this his Motion for Judgment on the verdict of the jury against the Defendants Avenue Shipping Co., Ltd., Trinder, Anderson & Company, Ltd., and the City of Galveston, and in favor of Plaintiff C. V. Rorie, Jr. and Texas Employers' Insurance Association.

Alternatively, and without waiving Plaintiff's right to have judgment against the hereinabove named three Defendants, Plaintiff C. V. Rorie, Jr. respectfully moves that Judgment for the Plaintiff and Intervenor Texas Employers' Insurance Association on the verdict of the jury be entered by the Court against Defendant City of Galveston.

MANDELL & WRIGHT

By: ARTHUR J. MANDELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
C. V. Rorie, Jr.

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
April-May Term, A. D. 1968

NO. 96,190

E. V. RORIE, JR.

v.

AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL.

Now comes the City of Galveston and files this motion, all parties having rested, with the understanding that the motion may be dictated and transcribed at a later time and will be considered for all purposes as though written out in advance, and moves the Court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for this Defendant, or, in the alternative, withdraw this case and render judgment for this Defendant for each and all of the following reasons:

I.

This Defendant would respectfully show the Court that there has been no evidence sufficient to go to the jury showing that this Defendant is in any way responsible in this particular case, because the evidence shows from the Plaintiff himself that the operator of the crane was acting under the direction and control of the stevedore and that the stevedore was in complete control of the discharging of the vessel. Therefore, the operator of the crane in law would become a lone servant, for which the City of Galveston would not be responsible.

II.

Because there is no showing of any negligence on the part of this Defendant.

III.

Because the evidence shows as a matter of law that the crane was being operated under signals from a signalman and that part of the operation, and this testimony comes from the Plaintiff himself, and he is bound by it, was to swing the crane underneath the coming of the ship.

IV.

Because, as a matter of law, the contractual arrangement between Strachan Shipping Co. and the City of Galveston set forth in Item 97 of Tariff Circular No. 4-B specifically provided that the operator shall be under the direction of Strachan Shipping Co. "and the operator shall be considered as the agent or servant of the lessee," which in this instance is Strachan Shipping Co., "and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such operator during the time of rental or lease"; that the Tariff becomes a part of the contract of lease between the City of Galveston and Strachan Shipping Co., and this Tariff provision controls the question of whether or not at the time of this accident Frank McPeters was a borrowed servant of Strachan Shipping Co.

V.

That there has been no showing, and no competent evidence that the crane was in any way defective.

WHEREFORE Defendant City of Galveston prays that the Court instruct the jury to return a verict for Defendant, or, in the alternative, withdraw this case from the jury and enter judgment for the Defendant.

Respectfully submitted,

McLEOD, ALEXANDER, POWEL & APFFEL

By V. W. McLEOD
Attorneys for the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, and the City of Galveston

To be filed nunc pro tunc as of May 1, 1968.

COURT: Your motion would go against the Plaintiff as well as Strachan Shipping Co.?

MR. McLEOD: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: The motion of the Defendant City of Galveston for an instructed verdict; or, in the alternative, motion that the case be removed from the jury and judgment rendered in favor of said Defendant is hereby overruled.

MR. McLEOD: To which the Defendant City of Galveston excepts. Your Honor.

THE STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF GALVESTON §

I, Mary E. McGowan, Official Court Reporter of the 56th District Court of Galveston County, Texas, do hereby certify that this is a true and correct transcript of the Motion dictated and proceedings had in chambers pertaining to said Motion in the presence of the Court and all Counsel in this case at the close of all the evidence.

WITNESS my hand at Galveston, Texas, this 18th day of December, A. D. 1969.

MARY E. McGOWAN
Official Court Reporter,
56th District Court,
Galveston County, Texas

NO. 96,190

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
TEXAS, — 56th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
APRIL-MAY TERM, A. D. 1968

C. V. RORIE, JR.,
v.
AVENUE SHIPPING CO., LTD., ET AL.

Now come the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, and the City of Galveston, Plaintiff having rested, and move the Court, with the understanding that the motion may be dictated here and transcribed at a later time, that the Court withdraw this case from the jury and enter judgment for these Defendants, or, in the alternative, that the Court instruct the jury to return a verdict for these Defendants for each and all of the following reasons:

I.

As to the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves they respectfully show the Court that they have shown that the operation known as the Galveston Wharves' operation is owned by the City of Galveston and operated by the City of Galveston through a board known as "The Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves"; that the courts have held in such instances that the City of Galveston is the only party that can sue or be sued, and we particularly invite the Court's attention to such decisions as Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority et al. v. Tuttle

et al., decided by the Court of Civil Appeals in 171 S.W.2d 520, and the Supreme Court refused a writ of error, with a written opinion in 174 S.W.2d 589.

II.

That there is no showing that any member of the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves actually participated in the operation on this particular day or was in any way personally negligent or personally responsible.

In such instances, of course, a member of the Board of Trustees, just like a member of a board of directors or a superior officer of a company, is not responsible, and we invite the Court's attention so that there will be no dispute as to our contention in this regard to such cases as Seismic Explorations, Inc., et al. v. Dobray, decision by the Court of Civil Appeals in Houston, 169 S.W.2d 739, and the Supreme Court refused a writ of error in that case.

III.

As to both Defendants they would respectfully show the Court that there has been no evidence sufficient to go to the jury showing that these Defendants are in any way responsible in this particular case, because the evidence shows from the Plaintiff himself that the operator of the crane was acting under the direction and control of the stevedore and that the stevedore was in complete control of the discharging of the vessel. Therefore, the operator of the crane in law would become a lone servant for which the City of Galveston would not be responsible and, of course, likewise the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves would not be responsible.

IV.

Because there is no showing of any negligence on the part of these Defendants.

V.

Because the evidence shows as a matter of law that the crane was being operated under signals from a signalman and that part of the operation, and this testimony comes from the Plaintiff himself, and he is bound by it, was to swing the crane underneath the coaming of the ship.

WHEREFORE these Defendants pray that they and each of them be granted a judgment and that the Court withdraw this case from the jury and enter judgment for these Defendants and each of them, or, in the alternative, that the Court instruct the jury to return a verdict for these Defendants and each of them.

Respectfully submitted,

McLEOD, ALEXANDER,
POWEL & APFFEL

By V. W. McLEOD
Attorneys for the Board of
Trustees of the Galveston
Wharves and the City of
Galveston

COURT: I grant your motion in so far as the Mayor and the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves are concerned. I overrule your motion in so far as the City of Galveston is concerned at this time.

MR. McLEOD: Note our exception.

To be filed nunc pro tunc as of April 29, 1968.

THE STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF GALVESTON §

I, Mary E. McGowan, Official Court Reporter of the 56th District Court of Galveston County, Texas, hereby certify that, after Plaintiff had rested and the jury had retired from the Courtroom, the foregoing Motion was dictated and the foregoing proceedings were had in connection with said Motion in the presence of the Court and all Counsel in this case; and I further certify that this transcrip of said Motion and proceedings is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand at Galveston, Texas, this 18th day of December, A. D. 1969.

MARY E. McGOWAN
Official Court Reporter,
56th District Court,
Galveston County, Texas

EXTRACTS FROM REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

[118][1] W. L. PATTERSON, Signalman

Q. Now tell us what happened on the last load that that crane operator operated that crane that morning. I want you to tell us from the start. Did you or did you not then give him the signal to lower the clam-bucket into the inshore side of No. 5 hatch?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. I am talking now about the last load just before Mr. Rorie was injured. Did you give him the same signal as you described to us before?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he follow the same procedure?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you give him a signal to stop?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he stop?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Tell us what happened next.

A. You mean the load that he came into get when Mr. Rorie got hurt?

Q. Right. Now, you testified you gave him a signal. He came down and stopped?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, what happened next?

A. Well, out of the clear blue sky the bucket started swinging, and—

Q. Well, it swung. What did it hit?

A. It hit the stanchion ladder and the stanchion in the middle [119] of the ship.

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1. All of the above numbered pages refer to Reporter's Statement of Facts.

Q. Then what happened?

A. It ricocheted, hit the cargo ore that was back there and—

Q. Did it ricochet again then?

A. Yes, sir, and Mr. Rorie was pinned under it.

Q. Did you see Mr. Rorie just immediately before he was pinned or struck by that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. By that clam-bucket?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. Where did you see him? What did you see him do?

A. I saw him running, climbing cargo boards.

Q. Climbing the sweat boards or the cargo boards?

A. Sweat boards, yes, sir.

Q. All right. Then did you give the crane operator, Mr. McPeters, a signal, any kind of a signal, after you gave him the signal to stop and he did stop the bucket?

A. No, sir, I did not.

Q. Do you know what caused him to swing that bucket after that?

A. No, sir, I do not.

Q. Was this swinging of the bucket slow or was it sort of wild and fast?

A. Well, it was rapid, wild.

Q. Now, you made a movement with your hand back and forth. Is that the way it looked to you?

A. Go that way and back this way, and that was it.

Q. Now, you say it went this way. You took your left hand and [120] gave a movement to your right. I am sorry. Took your left hand and made a movement to your left and back to the right. Is that the way it went?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, when it went, first, I believe you testified that it hit the steel stanchion and the ladder. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the center of the hatch?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then it ricocheted into some cargo?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Ore. Then ricocheted again and it went down toward the direction where Mr. Rorie was climbing?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you saw Mr. Rorie and before it hit him, he was climbing, trying to get out of the way?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, then, when that clam-bucket hit him what did you do? What did you see happen to Mr. Rorie? Let me put it that way.

A. Well, I just saw Mr. Rorie collapse and start yelling like he was in pain.

Q. What did you do? Did you run to him?

A. No, sir. I said, 'Hold everything.'

Q. 'Hold everything.' Who went down to see him, do you recall? If you remember,

A. I believe Jimmy Cox went down.

* * *

[251] C. V. RORIE

Q. All right. I want you to tell this jury what is the first thing that attracted your attention to that clam-bucket just before it hit you?

A. Well, I was standing, leaning up my back to the cargo-boards, waiting for the bucket to come in. I heard it always, kind of humming as he brought it over, and the first thing I knew the bucket hit the ladder and upright center-line stanchion just below the 'tween-deck, and

fire flew. I turned around to go up the cargo-boards, and the next thing I know they was taking me out of the hold of the ship.

Q. Can you positively tell the jury the position that you were in at the time that bucket hit you?

[252] A. Well, I was trying to get up the cargo-boards.

Q. Well, my question is: Can you tell the jury what position you were in; which way were you facing?

A. I was facing—I had turned around to go up, facing the side of the ship, the skin of the ship.

Q. Just before you got hit do you know which way you were facing?

A. No, sir. That is—I just was going up the cargo-boards. I don't know exactly. That is the first thing I do, I reckon, when something happens is try to get up above it.

Q. When you saw that clam-bucket hit the steps or the rungs of the ladder did you have any idea there which way that bucket might come?

A. No, sir. I sure didn't.

Q. So that the jury may know what we are talking about, I believe you testified that there was a separated bulkhead, separating the offshore side from the inshore side right in the middle, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What method was there supplied by the ship if you wanted to get up from the lower hold to the 'tween-deck above?

A. A ladder. There was a ladder on the center line right here (indicating), a ladder that went up.

Q. So, attached to that very wall that separated the offshore side from the inshore side on the forward part, there was a straight up-and-down, steel ladder?

A. Yes, sir.

[253] Q. It had rungs in it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that was probably put there so there would be a means for seamen, longshoremen or anybody who had any business to get up and down it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have any idea or any warning that that bucket was going to come in that way?

A. No, sir, I sure didn't.

Q. Did it come in that way, in fact, at all that morning?

A. No, sir.

Q. When that bucket hit you, tell us exactly what happened to you, if you knew what happened to you, or just what happened.

A. Well, the bucket got me. The best I remember I could feel of it kind of pull on my pants, and about that time it raised up and I turned loose and I fell down in on the ore in there in the long corner. I mean I don't know. I don't actually know what happened. I know it got me.

Q. Were you at that time smack up against the skin of the ship, as close as you could get against the skin of the ship?

A. Yes, sir. I was going to climb the sweat-boards.

Q. The only thing what separated you from the skin of the ship were the sweat-boards or cross-battens?

A. Yes, sir.

* * *

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

[358] MR. McLEOD: Your Honor, at this time we would like to offer into evidence this tariff.

COURT: All right, show it to Mr. Goller first.

MR. MANDELL: I have seen it, Your Honor.

COURT: Do you have any objections to it?

MR. MANDELL: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: Does Plaintiff have any objection to the exhibit being received in evidence?

PLAINTIFF'S BILL OF EXCEPTION NO.

MR. MANDELL: Let me look and see if it is the same thing that he gave me. Your Honor, we object to the introduction of Defendant City of Galveston's Exhibit No. 1 in so far as it affects Plaintiff's cause of action, because we have no knowledge of it and are not bound by it, and, moreover, nothing in it could possibly bind Plaintiff. There are some provisions in there, so far as Plaintiff is concerned, that would be contrary to public policy.

COURT: I don't know whether they affect you or don't, Mr. Mandell.

MR. McLEOD: Your Honor, we offer it against all parties and for all purposes, because it does create the arrangement between us and the stevedore in this case, and Mr. Mandell's client is affected by it, as well as for other reasons.

MR. MANDELL: Any arrangement, Your Honor, between the Galveston Wharves, the City of Gal-

veston and the Stevedoring Co. to which Plaintiff was not a party, had nothing to do with it, could not be binding on him, and we object to it so far as Plaintiff is concerned.

MR. GOLLER: Your Honor, on behalf of Strachan Shipping Co. we object [359] to the tariff on the unilateral instrument. It is not a contract binding upon Strachan Shipping Co. As far as being in the contractual area, if it should be construed as a contract it is a contract under business compulsion and, therefore, not binding upon Cross-Plaintiff Strachan Shipping Co.

COURT: I overrule both of your objections. It will be received in evidence. If it doesn't affect Plaintiff, it doesn't affect him, but I will admit it at this time.

(Said Galveston Wharves Tariff Circular No. 4-B, marked as Defendant Galveston's Exhibit No. 1, under Court order, accompanies this S.F. Admitted in its entirety at 480.)

MR. GOLLER: Note our exception.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, we for the record would like to object to it in so far as it affects the vessel or her owners, because we don't think it is material to any issue concerning these two defendants whom I represent.

COURT: I overrule the objection. It will be received in evidence.

MR. WILLIAMS: Note our exception.

MR. MANDELL: Note our exception.

MR. McLEOD: Mr. Robinson, will you please read to the jury Item 97 of that tariff?

MR. MANDELL: What page?

A. Page 5.

PLAINTIFF'S BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. ____

MR. MANDELL: Particularly, Your Honor, we call your attention to provision 97. The particular objection to that provision is as far as it affects Plaintiff, and we ask the Court to instruct the [360] jury that it does not affect Plaintiff. It deals primarily with relationships between the City of Galveston and Galveston Wharves with the Stevedoring Co. It should not and can not bind Plaintiff.

COURT: I overrule the objection at this time.

MR. MANDELL: Note the exception.

COURT: You will read it Mr. Robinson.

A. This item, Item 97, of Tariff 4-B is headed "Lessee Responsibility," and I quote.

MR. GOLLER: I am going to object to this particular provision as well on the grounds it is an unconstitutional provision, and I re-urge my motion made at the beginning

of the trial, that the tariff is not binding on Strachan Shipping Co. as a matter of law.

Mr. McLEOD: Your Honor, it is a tariff filed. It has never been attacked. If they thought it was an invalid instrument they should have gone before the Federal Maritime Commission and attacked it. It covers part of the tariff concerning this crane in question. It is a valid tariff, and we think it creates a relationship between the stevedore and the Wharves that determines under whose control and whose supervision the crane operates was working at the time of the accident in question, and it was plead both as a defense to Mr. Mandell's petition and as part of our cross-action.

COURT: I am particularly interested in the statement it is unconstitutional.

MR. GOLER: Yes, Your Honor. I have a number of cases I . . .

* * *

[410] HERMAN ERMIS

DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. V. W. McLeod:

Q. State your name, please.
A. Herman Ermis.
Q. Where do you live?
A. 3905 L.
Q. That is here in Galveston?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you lived here in Galveston, Mr. Ermis?

A. I think since 1941.

Q. By whom are you employed?

A. I am employed by Galveston Wharves.

Q. In what capacity are you employed by the Galveston Wharves.

A. Well, I was on the extra board for about 12 years, and in the last four years I have been a steady operator.

Q. This is a suit involving an accident that happened down on Pier 14 on September 6, 1940.

MR. MANDELL: 1960.

MR. McLEOD: I mean 1960, involving Mr. C. V. Rorie. I will ask you whether or not you were down on Pier 14 at that time.

A. Yes, sir, I was.

Q. What kind of work were you doing then?

* * *

Page 411, Line 1-14

A. Well, at that time I was called a fireman on the Brown hoist.

Q. What is a fireman? What are his duties?

A. Well, when we had a steam rig we were firing. Then we switched to Diesel, but we were called firemen until 1962 or 1963. We have changed.

Q. What did they change the name to?

A. Helper.

Q. To helper?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Back on September 6, 1960, were you employed as a helper or as a fireman on this crane operated by Mr. McPeters?

A. Well, I was his helper.

Q. And who operated this crane?

A. Frank McPeters.

Page 411, Line 17-21

Q. Mr. Ermis, what kind of crane was Mr. McPeters operating on the day we have been talking about, September 6, 1960?

A. It is a locomotive crane called the "Brown hoist."

Q. Do you remember the number of it?

A. No. 8.

Page 416; Line 13-27:

MR. McLEOD: Mr. Ermis, I will hand you what has been introduced as Defendant Galveston's Exhibit No. 8, and I am wondering if there is some way you could come over and show the jury where the operator sits and where the levers are. Can you all see that? The picture is not very large. (Witness stood in front of jury.)

A. That is the seat right here. This is the brake lever, and this is the clutch lever. We have two clutch levers and two brake levers. One is a forward brake, and one is a hand brake. The clutch—one is for the left hand and one is right hand.

Q. Then come back over here and I will ask you some questions about that. (Witness returned to the witness chair.) You have told us, I believe, that there are two levers on the right-hand side of the operator.

Page 417:

A. That's right.

Q. What are those two levers for?

A. One is your hand brake to hold your bucket when you change over to your closing line, you see, because you couldn't hold the bucket open—I mean closed if you use just one line. There is two lines on it, two cables, and you just switch over, throw this one back and step on your lever line, and it will hold the bucket. Then when you dump it you pull your hand brake, hold it with the hand brake, and you hold your foot brake, lock it, and the bucket opens.

Q. I will ask you whether or not the purpose of the brake is to keep the line of the bucket attached to it from falling down to the ground or the deck.

A. Yes, sir; that is what it is there for.

Q. We have talked about the two levers on the right. Do you also have two levers on the left?

A. Yes. There is a swing lever and your lever to pull your clutch in.

Q. What is the swing lever? When you use that, what is the purpose of that?

A. Move the boom.

Q. And does that or does it not cause, if you have a clam-bucket on it, the bucket to swing?

A. Yes, sure, the bucket will swing with the boom.

Q. What is the other lever for? You told us about the swing lever. What is the other lever?

A. That is to pull your clutch in. You run your engine, and . . .

Page 418, Line 1-3:

the bucket closes. You run the engine until you get the air to working, then step on that, turn over; turn loose, and empty the bucket.

Page 422, Line 2-14:

Q. No, not when you are dropping it, but say you want to swing it, is there any lever you can pull that will pull it up higher than this 3 or 4 feet you are talking about?

A. Yes, sir. That is your clutch lever.

Q. What does your clutch lever do?

A. One will jerk it back, and the lever line will close the bucket.

Q. That lever you pull to jerk the bucket, what happens to the bucket if it is swinging and you pull that lever?

A. The hand brake it will stop it.

Q. It will stop it?

A. Yes, it will stop it, not from swinging, but stop it from going down.

Page 424, Line 7-9:

Q. Mr. Ermis, whom was Mr. McPeters employed by on September 6, 1960?

A. Galveston Wharves.

Page 424, Line 15-27:

Q. Whom was he employed by on September 6, 1960?

A. Galveston Wharves.

Q. When a crane operator receives a signal from a signalman, who operates the lever?

A. The operator is the one that takes the signal.

Q. Who operates the Clutch?

A. The operator, the same man.

Q. And who operates the brake?

A. The same man.

Q. Now, then, have you ever seen a longshoreman get into the cab and operate a Wharf Company crane?

A. No, sir.

Q. Or locomotive crane?

[425] A. No, sir, not a longshoreman.

Q. You wouldn't let him do it, would you?

A. No, sir.

Q. Sir?

A. No, sir.

Q. If you were a crane operator and some gang foreman would say, "Let me operate that crane for a little bit," would you let him?

A. Crane foreman?

Q. No, a gang foreman or a longshoreman.

A. No, sir.

Q. From time to time these cranes break down, don't they?

A. Well, they break down, sure.

Q. And who fixes them?

A. Well, when it is out on the job and we can't fix it, we send it to the roundhouse, and a machinist fixes it.

Q. Do you let any of the longshoremen of the gang fix your crane?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You have never seen it done?

A. No, sir.

Q. And if some longshoreman would come up and say, "Let me fix it," you wouldn't let him do it, would you?

A. Not fix the crane. They would hook a line to the block or the bucket.

Q. Just to help pick something up, but I am talking about fixing the machine.

A. No, sir; no, sir.

Page 428, Line 9-22:

Q. Then you try to swing that bucket, do you not, so that it wouldn't hit, say, the bulkhead or the ladder? You have seen those ladders right in the center of the hatch?

A. Yes.

Q. You try hard not to hit it, don't you?

A. We don't see it. It is the signalman's duty to know how to lower it so we don't hit it.

Q. Well, all the signalman can do is tell you to lower?

A. All he can do is watch that man up there.

Q. All he can do is tell you to lower it?

A. Lower it, bring it up, and swing it.

Q. And the boom is so spotted, is it not, that it would not hit any portion of the ship, is that right?

A. That is correct.

Page 430, Line 5-27:

Q. And the way that is done is that the crane operator, by his controls, can pay out the cable so it will go all the way down?

A. You use your hand brake and watch the signalman and let it down slow.

Q. Well, the points I am making is that the one who controls the crane operator, who controls the clam-bucket, has enough cable there and it is long enough to reach all the way down to the bottom of No. 3 hold?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If in this instance there were only two holds, the 'tween deck and the next hold, then you have plenty more cable in there than you actually use?

A. Well, I think 120 foot or 220 foot.

Q. Over 100?

A. About 100 to 220 foot, something like that. On the Brown Hoist we use a 180 foot cable.

Q. So that how far that bucket would go depends on how much length of cable you have got?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If you give it more cable and you swing it, it will swing as much cable as it has?

A. You never turn that cable loose.

[431] Q. You shouldn't, should you?

A. No, sir.

Q. But you got that cable to turn it loose if you want to?

A. Sure. We have to give out enough cable to go as far as we want. If you let your foot off that cable, every load you put on there you will ravel it up.

Q. You are in bad shape?

A. Bad shape.

Q. Evidently, the crane operator is the only one that can control the speed with which the clam-bucket is lowered?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The crane operator is the only one that can control how much cable he will pay out?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The crane operator is the only one that can operate the brake or the clutch?

A. Yes, sir; that's right.

Q. Now, then, if a crane operator properly operates his machine and the boom is properly spotted the clam bucket will not hit any portion of the bulkhead or the ladder with so much force as to swing back and swing again and hit the one and then ricochet up against the side of the ship, will it?

A. Well,

Q. Did you understand my question?

A. I didn't quite get you.

Q. All right; I will repeat it slowly. If the crane operator properly operates the levers and the machine is in good [432] working condition, the clam bucket will not hit the side of the vessel at the lower hold of the vessel or the ladder with so much force as to cause it to swing back and then swing back again underneath forward underneath, and hit the one and ricochet against somebody, will it?

A. I wouldn't think so.

Q. No, sir. It has to be that either the crane operator improperly handled the crane or there was something wrong with the crane if something like that does happen.

MR. McLEOD: Your Honor we object because he hasn't put in the other factor of the crane being improperly spotted by the signalman.

MR. MANDELL: Your Honor this is cross-examination.

COURT: I overrule the objection.

MR. McLEOD: Note my exception.

MR. MANDELL: Did you understand my question, sir?

A. If the signalman in that case gives him the right signal, it will always hit where he wants it.

Q. Sir?

A. If the signalman gives him the right signal and he drops it, it should hit right.

Q. But my question was: If the crane was in good working condition and the operator properly operates that thing and the signalman gives him a signal to come on down, and if he comes down properly, that thing will not hit the ladder or on the bulkhead so hard as to swing back, swing forward, and hit the ore and ricochet?

A. Not if—if he goes down and the signal was given him, then he is the man that controls it.

Q. Who controls it?

A. The signalman. He can't see through that iron, no, sir.

Q. Is there any person besides the man at the control of that crane who can make that thing swing as hard as he wants to? Is there anybody else except the man who operates the controls?

A. Not as long as he is not at the controls he can't.

Q. The man at the controls is the only man who can?

A. That's right.

Page 435, Line 4-16:

Q. That crane is a regular locomotive, isn't it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It is a very complicated and expensive piece of machinery, isn't it?

A. That's right.

Q. The body of the crane itself moves? The crane itself sits on a railroad car like, with railroad wheels, and it fits on a railroad track?

A. Well, it is called a table. We have it on a wheel—we call it a "bull wheel"—and it has four rollers underneath, and you can turn it around.

Q. You can turn it completely around?

A. Yes, sir.

Page 437, Line 9-27:

MR. MANDELL: Do you gentlemen who are operators of these hoists have a supervisor?

A. Yes, sir, we have a supervisor.

Q. Who was the supervisor in 1960? Who was the supervisor when Mr. Rorie was hurt?

A. Johnnie Johnston.

Q. Does he come around from time to time to see how the work goes on?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he is the one that has the authority to tell you how to go about operating your crane?

A. Well, to some extent he has.

Q. Well, if he finds something that you don't operate just right, he is the one that could tell you about it and talk to you about it?

A. That's right.

Q. And if there is something wrong with a crane that you feel that you need to report to somebody higher than you, he is the man that you report to?

[438] A. That's right.

Q. And he is the man who sends somebody to have it fixed if it needs special attention or orders it to be taken back into the roundhouse?

A. That's right.

Q. Mr. Ermis, you don't belong to the Longshoremen's Local, do you?

A. No, sir.

Q. You do not get your job through the Longshoremen't Local, do you?

A. No, sir.

Q. As a matter of fact, you are a member of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, aren't you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they are the folks that represent you in bargaining with your employer, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Your union has an agreement, written agreement, with the Wharf Company, the City of Galveston, covering the conditions and wages of your employment?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Ermis, you were kind enough yesterday to explain how that bucket is swung underneath the hatch—I am sorry—underneath the 'tween-deck so that the cable actually comes close to or in contact with the coaming of the 'tween-deck.

A. That's right.

Q. Isn't that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I wish you would answer out loud, because this lady here, the Court Reporter, doesn't look at you.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You, as an experienced operator of a hoist or crane, wouldn't want anybody so close to, so near, the bucket where it swung that the bucket would hit him, would you?

A. No, sir. I wouldn't.

Q. That would be a very unsafe practice, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Answer out loud.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In fact, it would be dangerous, would it not?

A. Yes, sir, it would.

Page 446, Line 7-27:

Q. When they are using the snatch-block there is no reason to throw the bucket over?

A. That's right.

Q. They can pull it over with the snatch-block?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is the whole purpose of the snatch-block, so they can lower the bucket down and the snatch-block can pull it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So you don't have to throw the bucket if they have it rigged to a snatch-block?

A. No, sir, you don't.

Q. Now, you have seen that snatch-block arrangement used many times, have you not?

A. Yes, sir, I have.

Q. Was there anything at all that appeared to you to be unusual about that operation that morning up until the time this accident happened?

A. No, sir.

Q. It was going along just like you had seen it done many times before?

A. That's right.

Page 451, Line 11-27:

Q. Where is this man you say was the supervisor at that time, Mr. Johnston, if you know?

A. He has retired. I think he retired about two years ago.

Q. Would he normally come down there in the morning and kind of line out the work he wanted done, or did you just know your own jobs and set it up yourselves?

A. In fact, he was sitting in his car and looking right at it when the job was

Q. When the job was what?

A. When we were working.

Q. On that day, you mean?

A. Yes, sir. He was right there, just a little ways off, watching the work.

Q. As far as you could tell, he could see just the way McPeters was operating that crane?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I mean there was nothing to keep him from seeing, was there?

A. No, sir.

Page 454, Line 13-27:

Q. Well, a skilled operator can operate the bucket so that it goes down in the hold as slowly as he wants to, can he not?

A. Yes.

Q. And if he picks the bucket up he can operate it so he can pick it up slowly?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When he swings it across the ship, he can operate it as slowly or as fast as he wants?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The machine is so designed that he can put that bucket in wherever he wants it just as easily as he wants to; isn't that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I believe you said the clutch lever is the one that controls the swing of the boom.

Page 455, Line 1-16:

A. No, sir, not the clutch lever; the swing lever.

Q. If you use that lever and swing the bucket into the hold and want to move it over 4 feet, you can boom it over 4 feet, can't you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And practically set it down in the center of the ship, that is, I guess, if you want to do it?

A. Sure.

Q. So if the bucket was brought down here just inside the forward hatch coaming of the ship and you wanted to move it over just as close as you could to get a fall wire close to this coaming, you could do it very slowly?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And set it down there or hold it or suspend it any way you want to do it?

A. Yes, sir.

Page 456, Line 15-27:

Q. Mr. Ermis, I don't recall whether you have been asked questions about this or not, but to your knowledge no one operates the City of Galveston's cranes other than City of Galveston employees; isn't that right?

A. That's right.

Q. And you don't have any longshoremen that are employed by the stevedoring companies in the cabs of the cranes to operate the levers to control the crane at any time, do you?

A. No, sir.

Q. You don't allow the stevedoring companies' employees to do any of the maintenance on the cranes whatsoever?

A. No, sir.

Page 460, Line 17-27:

Q. And under no circumstances should the operator operate the hoist where the bucket would hit a ladder and swing back and then swing back again; no one should operate a crane that way?

A. I guess if it hit something it would.

Q. Well, that's right. It would hit back, would it not? It would swing back?

A. It would probably swing twisted up.

Q. And start turning around, but how far that thing would go back and how far it would go forward again would depend on how fast you operated?

Page 461, Line 1-3:

A. Well, I guess it would.

Q. Sir?

A. I guess it would.

RELEVANT TESTIMONY OF W. H. SANDBERG CITY'S WHARVES MANAGER

Page 466, Line 9-27:

Q. Mr. Sandberg, was it you or your office that conducted the negotiations with Texas Railway—

A. Maintenance of Way employees?

Q. Yes.

A. It is done on a national basis.

Q. Involving many railroads?

A. That's right.

Q. To which the Galveston Wharves, or the City of Galveston through the Galveston Wharves, becomes a party to the contract?

A. That is correct.

Q. And it governs conditions of employment?

A. That's right.

Q. Wages?

A. That is correct.

Q. Vacation fringe benefits?

A. That is correct.

Q. And all of these come to your employees by reason of their employment with the City of Galveston?

[467] A. That is correct.

Q. And they are the object of many, many instruments and addenda from time to time?

A. You mean the contract?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And Galveston Wharves or the City of Galveston is a signatory to these agreements covering the employees who operate locomotives or hoists?

A. They become a party to the Maintenance of Way by agreement, and we are signatories to the Maintenance of Way agreement, which includes hoist operators.

Q. In other words, there are some other employees who come under this agreement?

A. That's right.

Q. The employees operating the crane or the hoist are paid directly by the City of Galveston through the Galveston Wharves, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. They look to the City of Galveston through the Galveston Wharves for their payment for whatever work they do?

A. They look to the Galveston Wharves for their payment.

Q. Which is part of the City of Galveston?

A. Well, it is part of the City of Galveston, but I doubt very seriously whether the City of Galveston would ever aid them out of their funds.

Q. Then, they have overtime schedules?

[468] A. They do.

Q. Have vacation plans?

A. They have.

Q. Retirement benefits?

A. Under the Railroad Retirement Act.

Q. That, of course, has an indirect relationship to the work they do for the Galveston Wharves?

A. That's right.

Q. It is the Galveston Wharves that maintains and has the duty to maintain these hoists so they would be in proper working condition?

A. That's right.

Q. The operators who run them are directly responsible to their supervisor or foreman, whatever you may call him?

A. That is correct.

Q. No one but a regular employee employed as an operator of the Brown hoist will be permitted to operate hoists whenever they are working?

A. That is correct.

Q. No one but an employee of the Galveston Wharves will be permitted to repair or maintain these hoists, except

an employee of the Galveston Wharves who is qualified and employed for that purpose?

A. That is not correct.

Q. Who would?

A. We can contract out.

Q. Either an employee would do it or someone that the Galveston Wharves would designate by contract?

A. That is correct.

Q. A stevedore may have the use of this property and no obligation or duty to repair; he would not be permitted to repair or attempt to repair or maintain this hoist?

A. That is correct.

Page 470, Line 17-27:

Q. What about rail cranes? Have any of the stevedores been able to put rail cranes on?

A. You mean stevedores?

Q. Yes, sir, other than Galveston Wharves cranes.

A. None have ever used a locomotive crane.

Q. That is what I mean.

A. To my knowledge, no. It wouldn't be practical, because they would have to bring them from some location. By the time they paid switching charges and rail charges it would be prohibitive.

Q. Pier 14 is served by a railroad track where locomotive cranes

Page 471, Line 1-2:

are normally used?

A. It is not accessible to close-track or rubber-tired cranes.

Page 475, Line 17 and 18:

Q Mr. Sandberg, do you know the approximate cost of a Brown hoist No. 8?

Page 475, Line 27

COURT I overrule the objection if you know, Mr. Sandberg.

Page 476, Line 1 :

you may answer.

A They run between $75,000.00 and $100,000.00.

Page 476, Line 10 :27:

Q Mr. Sandberg, possibly it has been asked before, I am not sure but I want to ask you whom these men that operate the cranes; and the oilers, are employed by. There is no doubt about it that they are general employees of the City of Galveston; isn't that correct? They are on the City of Galveston's payroll?

A. No, the Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves.

Q. Is that not a part of the City of Galveston?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. So, in effect, they are paid by the City of Galveston, whether it comes out of the Galveston Wharves' funds or the City of Galveston's funds?

A. That's right.

Q. Their salaries are subject to deduction for Social Security taxes and retirement?

A. All employees of the Galveston Wharves come under railroad retirement.

Q. They deduct that in lieu of Social Security?

[477] A. That's right.

Q. And Federal income taxes are withheld by the City of Galveston or Galveston Wharves?

A. That is correct.

Q. Do they not get paid vacations by their employer?

A. They do.

Q. And they have hospitalization benefits?

A. They do.

Q. And the only person or legal entity having the right to hire or fire one of these operators would be their supervisors that are also employees of the City of Galveston?

A. That is correct.

Q. So if you had an incompetent operator, one that didn't measure up to standards, who would be the only one I am talking about the City again with authority to fire him?

A. We would have the only authority to fire the man.

Q. When one of these cranes goes out on a job, the person using it, whether he be a stevedore or some equipment, has to take the operator that you furnish?

A. If he takes one of our cranes, yes.

Q. And he has to take him as he finds him? He can't give him any directions or control over the operation of that machine other than have him follow the signals of a flagman?

A. Once he is employed by that stevedore he takes on orders from that stevedore.

Q. And the stevedore doesn't tell him how to operate the levers or controls of the machine, does he?

[478] A. Again we are talking about the handling of that crane?

Q. Yes.

A. He doesn't tell him what lever to pull.

Q. Other than taking signals from a flagman, everything that the crane operator does on that job he is doing for the City of Galveston? He decides how fast to swing it out, what lever to pull to swing that boom right or left, does he not?

A. That's right.

Q. Nobody from the stevedoring company is up there in the cab looking over his shoulder and telling him how to operate the machine?

A. No, sir.

Q. These operators, I presume, are trained by the Galveston Wharves.

A. Sometimes they are trained when they come to us. They have had experience with other people and served their apprenticeship.

Q. At least, they are qualified operators in their jobs, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. You wouldn't entrust your new cranes to the average longshoreman that they get over at the union hall, would you?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how long it takes to train a crane operator before you turn him loose to operate on his own?

A. No, I don't.

Page 479, Line 1-5:

Q. Do you have a training program for them in the City?

A. Yes, we have one. Of course, it depends on the men. Some men learn more rapidly than others, learn faster than others.

Q. Oh, they train them on the job, then?
A. Yes.

[480] OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

COURT: Mr. McLeod, I am ready to rule on these other things.

MR. WILLIAMS: As I advised the Court in so far as that exhibit is concerned we objected prior to the Court's ruling.

COURT: This is Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, which I had previously admitted in evidence, and additional objections were made to Sec. 97. I now overrule all objections and admit it in evidence in its entirety. (Marked at p. 356). Previously admitted at p. 359.

MR. WILLIAMS: May the record reflect that we join in each and all of the objections made by Strachan Shipping Co. to the admission of that document?

MR. GOLLER: For the record, note our exception.

MR. WILLIAMS: Note our exception.

COURT: Note everybody's exception. Mr. McLeod you wanted to read it the other day. You may do so at this time.

MR. McLEOD: Thank you, Your Honor. Item No. 97 of Tariff Circular No. 4-B provides:

"When cranes, derricks, hoists, conveyors, lift trucks, trucks, tractors, etc., are rented or leased to others, it is expressly understood that the unit will be operated under the direction and control of the lessee and the lessee shall be responsible for the operation thereof, and the lessee assumes all risks for injuries or damages which may arise or grow out of the use or operation of said unit.

"It is hereby understood and agreed that in the event lessee uses the operator of said unit employed by the Galveston Wharves, such operator shall be under the direction of the lessee and the operator shall be considered as the agent or servant of the lessee and lessee shall be responsible for the acts of such operator during the time of rental or lease. It is incumbent upon the lessee to make a thorough inspection and satisfy himself as to the physical condition and capacity of the unit, as well as the competency of the operator, there being no representation or warranties with reference to such matters."

* * *

FRANK GARCIA, a witness for Strachan Shipping Co., Cross-Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff, having first been duly sworn, testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Theodore Goller:

Q. State your name, please.
A. Frank Garcia.
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Garcia?

A. 2014 - 39th Street.

Q. How long have you lived in Galveston?

A. Oh, 60 years.

Q. Is that your age, 60 years?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is your occupation, Mr. Garcia?

A. I am a foreman.

Q. Foreman of what?

A. Ship foreman on the docks.

Q. For longshoremen?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you been engaged in longshoring work?

A. About 40 years.

Q. And where have you performed work as a longshoreman?

A. On the docks in Galveston.

* * *

[503] Q. Mr. Garcia, in your experience on the waterfront, and I understand you had 13 years as walking foreman with Strachan and some 11 years with Texas Transport & Terminal Co., have you ever seen any crane used in a stevedoring operation at the Port of Galveston other than a crane owned by the Galveston Wharves or the City of Galveston?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you ever seen any crane operated on the waterfront other than with an operator supplied by the City of Galveston?

A. I didn't quite understand you on that one.

Q. I said Have you ever seen any crane, in your experience, operated on the waterfront by an operator other than one employed by the City of Galveston?

A. No, sir, I haven't.

Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether any cranes belonging to outsiders have ever been used in this port?

A. No, sir.

* * *

JOHN W. CAIN, a witness for Strachan Shipping Co., Cross Defendant and Cross Plaintiff, having first been duly sworn, testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Theodore Goller:

Q. State your name, please.

A. John W. Cain.

Q. Where do you live?

A. 511 Avenue C, La Marque.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. Operating Engineer for the Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores.

Q. How long have you been so employed?

[504] A. Eighteen years.

Q. Do you do any other work in addition to that?

A. I was independent marine surveyor and marine consultant.

Q. Can you give us a little of your background? Tell us how you got to be operating engineer for Atlantic &

Gulf Stevedoring, marine surveyor and your experience at sea if you had any.

A. I started going to sea on American vessels in 1936. I sailed till I came ashore in Galveston in 1948. I have sailed in most capacities from ordinary seaman to master.

Q. Do you hold any license?

A. Yes, sir. I have a fourth issue of master's license, first class, and pilot at San Juan, Nicaragua.

* * *

[578] Q. Have you, since 1954, after you were promoted to manager of Atlantic & Gulf here in Galveston, been manager of Atlantic & Gulf here in Galveston, been actively engaged in stevedoring work?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you still go on ships and still supervise loading?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you order cranes in the day and time for use when discharging ships?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Whom do you obtain them from?

A. Galveston Wharves.

Q. Have you ever obtained any cranes for discharging vessels in the Port of Galveston since you have been here from anyone other than Galveston Wharves?

A. No, I haven't.

Q. Then, I take it—well, let me ask you this question. Has Atlantic & Gulf used any shore-based cranes in the Port of Galveston since you have been here that you have obtained from some source other than Galveston Wharves?

[579] A. No. The only cranes I have been using in operations in Galveston have come from Galveston Wharves.

Q. What about cranes for heavy lifts, barge type cranes, have you used those?

A. I have used them, but there isn't any in Galveston. It has been quite some time back.

Q. Galveston Wharves doesn't have those for rent?

A. No, Galveston Wharves doesn't have those.

Q. Have you ever been able to rent from Galveston Wharves one of these mobile cranes that does not operate on railroad tracks, rubber tired cranes?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Sir?

A. I saw one yesterday.

Q. Where?

A. Out at 33rd Street.

Q. Where was it working?

A. Across from the cotton shed.

Q. Was it working on a railroad track?

A. No. It was a Lorain rubber tired crane.

Q. To your knowledge, have there been any cranes working in the Port of Galveston where railroad tracks are in existence that are not owned and operated by the Galveston Wharves?

A. No.

Q. Have you seen any cranes working in areas in the Port of Galveston where there was no trackage, railroad trackage?

A. Yes, I have seen them working on Pier 26.

[580]. Q. When was that?

A. About two weeks ago.

Q. There were no tracks on Pier 26?

A. No, no tracks on Pier 26.

* * *

[6011] REDIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Theodore Collier

Q. I have one or two questions, Your Honor. Captain Cain, you testified in response to one of Mr. McLeod's questions that you saw a rubber tired crane at Pier 39

A. Yes, some time back.

Q. How long back, back a couple of years ago?

A. I don't remember the exact date. I guess about November somewhere, October or November of last year.

Q. In 1967?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any tracks out at Pier 39 where that crane was operated, any railroad tracks?

A. There are tracks there.

Q. Have you seen any rubber tired mobile cranes operating in the Port of Galveston? Did you see any such in 1960?

A. No.

Q. I mean

A. There is a reason. The reason is from what I understand, I told you about Pier 39. The reason a [illegible] crane was used was because a [illegible] could not be used.

Q. Why?

A. Because of the tracks. I understand from [illegible] the tracks were—

MR. McLEOD: Your Honor, we would object to any report. It would be hearsay.

COURT: Only what you know.

[602] A. I do know. I surveyed that ship.

MR. GOLLER: You were marine surveyor on a ship at Pier 39?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had they ordered a Brown hoist and were unable to get it?

MR. McLEOD: Your Honor, he is leading the witness.

COURT: I sustain the objection.

MR. GOLLER: Mr. Cain, tell us how you know why they were not using the Brown hoist? And tell us, please, the basis of your knowledge.

A. My ship—I don't remember strictly. I believe the name of the ship was "Sacramento." I was asked to make a survey for the contracting stevedore. A Brown hoist had been down there, and it was described to me in these words—

MR. McLEOD: Your Honor, there again he is saying what was described to him, and I would object to it on the grounds it would be hearsay.

MR. GOLLER: Did you see the Brown hoist come in there and try to come in to the dock?

A. No. The Brown hoist was—it was in the dock, already in the dock.

Q. Was he down where he could reach the ship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it being used?

A. It had been used, yes, sir.

Q. Well, what part of the ship had it been used on?

A. In No. 2, I believe.

Q. In No. 2 hold?

[603] A. No. 2 hatch, yes.

Q. What part of the ship did you say the rubber-tired crane worked on?

A. That was put in to replace the Brown hoist at No. 2.

Q. At No. 2?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they both working the same side of the hatch, say inshore side or offshore?

A. They were not working together. The Brown hoist was withdrawn and the rubber-tired hoist continued on.

Q. Do you know why the Brown hoist was withdrawn?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why was it withdrawn?

A. The condition of the trackage on Pier 39.

Q. It was unsafe for it to work there?

A. Yes, sir.